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Abstract
This essay will reconsider the fundamentals of obscenity law: the harm that
the law addresses and the means by which the law tries to prevent that harm.
Strangely, even though an enormous amount of scholarship examines this doc-
trine, these fundamentals have not been adequately addressed. The harm that the
doctrine seeks to prevent is not offense to unwilling viewers. It is not incitement
to violence against women. It is not promotion of sexism. Rather, it is moral
harm - a concept that modern scholarship finds hard to grasp. Liberals have not
even understood the concept of moral harm, and so their arguments have often
missed the point of the laws they were criticizing. Conservatives have understood
the concept quite well, but have thought that it straightway entailed censorship.
This essay is, to my knowledge, the first presentation of the liberal argument that
does justice to the conservative case for censorship. I will argue that the concept
is a coherent one and that obscenity law tries to prevent a genuine evil. But I will
conclude that the law is too crude a tool for the task. A sound understanding of
obscenity law’s ambitions reveals that the doctrine is unworkable and should be
abandoned.
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ESSAY
DOES OBSCENITY CAUSE MORAL HARM?
Andrew Koppelman*
The classic justification for obscenity law is to prevent readers from be-
ing depraved and corrupted by sexually oriented publications.  Moral harm
is not an unfamiliar idea.  It is what most parents have in mind when they
censor what their children are allowed to see.  Yet liberal critics of the doctrine
have not understood it, and so have often missed the point of the laws they
were criticizing.  Texts shape our view of the world.  Just as good literature
invites us to perceive the world subtly and empathetically, it is possible—
indeed, it is common—for novels, films, or television shows to view the world
crudely and insensitively, and to spin out self-aggrandizing fantasies that
invite self-centeredness and cruelty.  Texts that do this can indeed cause
moral harm.  Discerning the moral content of texts is, however, too complex a
task for the law to undertake.  Some pornography is morally bad because it
encourages the reader to regard other people as mere objects of sexual interest,
whose feelings and desires do not matter.  But this cannot be the basis for a
workable legal test for obscenity, because it is too vague and its application
too contestable to be a rule of law.  Moral harm is not identical with, and
only fortuitously overlaps with, what any legal test focuses on:  the dissemi-
nation of particular types of images or subject matter.  Obscenity law is thus
an unsuitable solution to the problem it seeks to address, and should be
abandoned.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay will reconsider the fundamentals of obscenity law:  the
harm that the law addresses and the means by which the law tries to pre-
vent that harm.  Strangely, even though an enormous amount of scholar-
ship examines this doctrine, these fundamentals have not been ade-
quately addressed.  The harm that the doctrine seeks to prevent is not
offense to unwilling viewers.  It is not incitement to violence against wo-
men.  It is not promotion of sexism.  Rather, it is moral harm—a concept
that modern liberalism finds hard to grasp.
Because liberals have not even understood the concept of moral
harm, their arguments have often missed the point of the laws they were
criticizing.  Conservatives have understood the concept quite well, but
have thought that it straightway entailed censorship.  This Essay is, to my
knowledge, the first presentation of the liberal argument that does justice
to the conservative case for censorship.
This Essay argues that the concept is a coherent one and that obscen-
ity law tries to prevent a genuine evil, but that the law is too crude a tool
for the task.  A sound understanding of obscenity law’s ambitions reveals
that the doctrine is unworkable and should be abandoned.
I. THE PUZZLE OF OBSCENITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has declared that, under the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution,1 “government has no power to restrict expres-
sion because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”2
The reasons are familiar.  The people cannot control the government if
the government gets to control what the people think.3  Discussion con-
1. U.S. Const. amend. I, provides in pertinent part:  “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”
2. Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
3. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1960); Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy
and the Problem of Free Speech (1993); Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A
Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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trolled by the state is less likely to discover truth than a free market in
ideas.4  Human dignity depends on the freedom of the mind.5
The Court’s formulation is, however, an obvious overstatement.  The
Court has laid down a number of categories of unprotected speech that
are defined by their content.  The First Amendment does not protect, for
example, defamation with actual malice,6 false or misleading commercial
advertising,7 fraudulent solicitation,8 incitement to lawbreaking,9 or
threats of violence.10
All but one of these exceptions rest on fraud or harm to third par-
ties, rather than on the intrinsic evil of the prohibited message.  That one
is obscenity.11  Material can be obscene even if it has no likelihood of
inciting anyone to unlawful conduct, and even if no unwilling viewer is
ever likely to see and thereby be offended by it.  Obscenity law aims at
preventing the formation of certain thoughts—typically, erotic ones—in
the minds of willing viewers.12
4. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1978)
(1859).
5. See Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression:  A Critical Analysis (1984); C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964 (1978);
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law:  Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204 (1972); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and
Freedom of Expression, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 334 (1991).
6. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–88 (1964).
7. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 & n.24 (1976); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
8. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 624 (2003).
9. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
10. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
11. Obscenity is to be distinguished sharply from child pornography, which is
prohibited because children are harmed in its production and the harm cannot be
effectively prevented so long as there is a profitable market for its products.  See Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)
(“[T]he distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of
material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively
controlled.”).  This Essay’s claims are nonetheless relevant to the child pornography
question, because the harm that children suffer when they participate in production is
hard to describe without recourse to the broad conception of well-being advocated here.
12. This was noted long ago by Louis Henkin, who, however, was entirely baffled by
the notion of harm that concerned the Court.  See Louis Henkin, Morals and the
Constitution:  The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391, 407 (1963) (“Private ‘morals’
and their ‘corruption’ and what ‘corrupts’ them . . . are not in the realm of reason and
cannot be judged by standards of reasonableness; they ought not, perhaps, to be in the
domain of government.”).  The present test for determining whether a publication is
obscene, laid down in Miller v. California, is:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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The Warren Court, which was the first to consider whether restric-
tions on sexually explicit literature might violate the First Amendment,
dismantled much of the apparatus of suppression that existed at that
time, but ensured the survival of the rest by devising the category of un-
protected obscenity.  The judges were not merely bowing to political re-
sistance when they preserved the censorship of sexual speech.  One law
student, interviewing for a clerkship in Chief Justice Earl Warren’s cham-
bers in 1967, was asked whether he agreed with Warren’s view that ob-
scenity is unprotected, and was advised before answering that an affirma-
tive response (to this and no other question) was a requirement for the
job.13  William Brennan, one of the Court’s great civil libertarians, was so
offended by a publisher who advertised nonobscene materials in a way
that appealed to buyers’ prurient interests that he tossed aside traditional
notions of legal notice and created a brand new crime of pandering, for
which he sent the publisher to jail without pausing for a trial.14
Modern First Amendment theory typically either ignores or misun-
derstands the state interests that underlie obscenity law.  Neither of-
fense15 nor incitement to violence against women16 are the doctrine’s
core concerns, and so the doctrine is not effectively attacked by showing
that obscenity does not cause these evils.17  The Court is persuaded that
something very bad happens when citizens contemplate obscene materi-
als.  A responsive critique should find out what that is and why it is sup-
posed to be so bad.
This Essay attempts to state, in its strongest form, the state interest
that justifies the suppression of obscenity.  It draws on scholarship in liter-
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted).
13. Telephone Interview with Lucas A. Powe, Professor of Law, University of Texas
(Dec. 9, 2003).  Powe, the applicant, answered the question truthfully and thereby
disqualified himself.  (He later clerked for Justice Douglas.)  “If anyone showed that book
to my daughters,” Warren told a clerk when discussing one appeal, “I’d have strangled him
with my own hands.”  Ed Cray, Chief Justice:  A Biography of Earl Warren 326–27 (1997).
14. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475–76 (1966).  The injustice of
Ginzburg has been noted by many commentators.  See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy
Tradition 43–44 (1988); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics
344–49 (2000).  Brennan later conceded that the decision was “the worst mistake” he ever
made.  Edward de Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere:  The Law of Obscenity and the
Assault on Genius 503 (1992).
Another revealing episode occurred in the Court’s 1956 Term, when Felix
Frankfurter’s law clerk argued that the book being prosecuted in one case seemed fairly
innocuous.  The clerk later told an interviewer that, when he told Frankfurter that his wife
agreed, the Justice “was apoplectic about the fact that an innocent young woman like my
wife should see this.”  Id. at 292.
15. See infra Part III.D.
16. See infra Part III.G.
17. Still less effective is a general claim that government should never legislate on the
basis of moral judgments.  See Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression:  The
Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1564 (1988).  This claim has
not, of course, gone unchallenged by defenders of pornography regulation.  See, e.g.,
Harry M. Clor, Mill and Millians on Liberty and Morality, 47 Rev. Pol. 3 (1985).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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ary theory that explores how texts promote certain dispositions in the
reader.  This Essay concludes that moral harm is a meaningful concept,
and that some literature can produce it.  When the state suppresses ob-
scenity, it does something like what I do as a parent when I try to control
what my children see.  Of course, I don’t want my children to assault
anyone, but that improbable danger is not what motivates me.  My hopes
for them are less crude, and less modest.
But this Essay intends to bury obscenity doctrine, not to praise it.
Once the case for preventing moral harm is understood, it becomes clear
that this is an end that censorship is ill suited to promote.  Outside of
sexual literature, the First Amendment presumes that adults can be
trusted to see even violent and malign entertainment.  Sex is not different
enough to warrant different treatment.  The inevitable clumsiness of the
law in this area is highlighted by the remarkably poor fit between obscen-
ity law’s scope and the evil that it seeks to prevent.  It matters what we
think and feel.  But it does not follow that the law should police what we
think and feel.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE IDEA OF MORAL HARM
A. The Official Rationale
The earliest and most influential definition of obscenity is the En-
glish case Regina v. Hicklin, which holds that a publication is obscene if it
has a “tendency . . . to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open
to such immoral influences.”18  The modern United States Supreme
Court follows this approach, with modifications.19  The First Amendment
does not protect “material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest,” which means, “material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts.”20
18. L.R.-Q.B. 360, 371 (1868).
19. The debt of modern obscenity law to Hicklin is shown in Joel Feinberg, Offense to
Others 171–78 (1985).  Feinberg observes that the modern test “is not really a ‘substitute’
for Hicklin so much as a mere modification of Hicklin:  ‘average person’ is substituted for
unusually susceptible persons, ‘contemporary community standards’ for eternally fixed
Victorian standards, ‘the material as a whole’ for isolated passages.”  Id. at 176.  For useful
treatments of the history of obscenity law, see generally de Grazia, supra note 14; Helen R
Lefkowitz Horowitz, Rereading Sex:  Battles over Sexual Knowledge and Suppression in
Nineteenth-Century America (2002); Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum:  Pornography
in Modern Culture (1987); P.R. MacMillan, Censorship and Public Morality (1983);
Geoffrey Robertson, Obscenity:  An Account of Censorship Laws and Their Enforcement
in England and Wales (1979).
20. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 & n.20 (1957).  Not all such material is
legally obscene.  Pornography, in order to be obscene, must fall within the complex
definition the Court articulated in Miller.  See supra note 12.  Appeal to prurient interest R
remains part of the definition, however.  I will hereafter use “pornography” to refer to
material calculated to appeal to the prurient interest, whether or not it satisfies the Miller
test.  Thus, for example, Playboy is pornographic but not obscene.  This use is not
etymologically sound, see Richards, supra note 5, at 47–51, but it corresponds with present R
American usage.  Some feminist writers have proposed to redefine pornography as
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Just what interest is threatened by lustful thoughts?  The anti-
pornography crusaders of the nineteenth century thought that if sexual
material came into the possession of teenage boys, it would induce them
to masturbate, and this in turn would lead to lassitude, weakness, crime,
insanity, and early death.21  No one believes this today.  But there is still
considerable support for regulating pornography, and prosecutions con-
tinue to take place.22  Why?  What is the best case that can be made for
the idea that at least some pornography can cause moral harm?
The most articulate defense of the constitutional nonprotection of
obscenity that appears in any Supreme Court opinion is Chief Justice Bur-
ger’s opinion for the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,23 decided on
the same day that the present test for obscenity was laid down in Miller v.
California.24  No earlier opinion of the Court had even attempted to artic-
ulate the state’s interests.25  The key passage is the following:
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete educa-
tion requires the reading of certain books, and the well nigh
universal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, im-
necessarily involving the subordination of women—and thus to be contrasted with
“erotica,” which is not subordinating—but this usage is idiosyncratic.
21. See Horowitz, supra note 19, at 92–93, 97–107, 394–403; Kendrick, supra note 19, R
at 138–43.  The best general history of the masturbation panic, which began in the early
1700s and survives in attenuated form today, is Thomas W. Laqueur, Solitary Sex:  A
Cultural History of Masturbation (2003).
22. For an account of the federal government’s vigorous efforts in the late 1980s and
early 1990s to put the largest mail order merchants out of business, see generally Philip D.
Harvey, The Government vs. Erotica (2001).  On more recent federal prosecutions, see
Eric Lichtblau, Justice Dept. Fights Ruling on Obscenity, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 2005, at A25
(reporting thirty-eight convictions since 2001); G. Beato, Xtreme Measures:  Washington’s
New Crackdown on Pornography, Reasononline, May 2004, available at http://www.
reason.com/0405/fe.gb.xtreme.shtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
details of two prosecutions).  The Department of Justice has exaggerated the number of
convictions it has secured.  A December 2003 memo released to Concerned Women for
America claimed twenty-one convictions, but if one excludes cases of child pornography
and distribution of obscenity to minors, the number shrinks to five.  The list appears in Jan
LaRue, DOJ Releases List of ‘Obscenity Prosecutions During This Administration,’ Dec. 18,
2003, at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay.asp?id=5022&department=LEGAL&categoryid
=pornography (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
23. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
24. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see supra note 12. R
25. Earlier decisions, following Justice Brennan’s opinion in Roth, had simply
proclaimed obscenity unprotected, therefore rendering unnecessary any consideration of
the state’s interests.  Lucas Powe explains what is unsatisfactory about this strategy:
[I]f one doesn’t know why obscenity is evil, it is difficult to know what limits to
place on its regulation.  The definition of the prohibited materials is inextricably
linked to the rationale for regulation, but Brennan severed the link, never finding
the reasons relevant.  As a consequence he was never able to define successfully
what he was certain the government could proscribe.
Powe, supra note 14, at 117.  For a similar analysis from a different political perspective, see R
Harry M. Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality:  Censorship in a Liberal Society 40–43
(1969) [hereinafter Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality].  The Court’s decisions after Paris
Adult Theatre have been even less articulate.
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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prove the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop
character, can we then say that a state legislature may not act on
the corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books, or
public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency
to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to antisocial
behavior? . . . The sum of experience, including that of the past
two decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude
that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to
family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality, can be debased and distorted by crass commercial
exploitation of sex.26
Burger’s concern has three elements:  harm of a kind analogous to
whatever benefit is imparted by good books, a crass affect toward sex, and
consequent debasement and distortion of sex.  What sense can be made
of these claims?
B. The Idea of Moral Harm
Harry Clor is the most articulate philosophical defender of legal reg-
ulation of obscenity.27  He argues that Burger is correct that sexuality is
both important and vulnerable.  The erotic often “is an arena in which
primitive or powerfully self-centered urges and elevated aspirations are in
competition for predominance.”28  Thus sex “can be the inspiration for a
sustained intimacy and affection with another person—and it can be the
occasion for possessiveness, hostilities, and humiliation.”29
Could one possibly harm a person by inflaming his sexual passions?
Clor notes that “notions of what is harmful to human beings are ulti-
mately linked to ideas of what is good for us.”30  Unless it can be shown
26. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 63 (citations omitted).  Burger here argues in
passing that obscene material also might lead to antisocial behavior, see also id. at 60–61,
but this is makeweight.  As Professor Redish observes, “the harmful effect alleged is so
speculative that in no area of protected speech would such a showing justify regulation.”
Redish, supra note 5, at 71; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, R
245–50 (2002) (rejecting this justification for suppressing computer-generated imitations
of child pornography).  The causal claim also is parasitic on Burger’s claim about moral
harm; it is precisely obscenity’s corrupting and debasing impact that allegedly leads to
antisocial behavior.
27. Other thoughtful defenses include Robert P. George, Making Children Moral:
Pornography, Parents, and the Public Interest, in In Defense of Natural Law 184 (1999);
Walter Berns, Beyond the (Garbage) Pale or Democracy, Censorship and the Arts, in
Freedom of Expression:  Essays on Obscenity and the Law 49 (Harry Clor ed., 1971); Irving
Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity, and the Case for Censorship, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1971
(Magazine), at 24.  It is, of course, true that much opposition to pornography rests on less
respectable sources, such as primitive pollution fears and a prudish antipathy to sex.  But a
fair criticism of the present regime should respond to the strongest claims that can be
made on its behalf, and that is what I try to do here.
28. Harry M. Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society:  Essays on Decency, Law and
Pornography 64 (1996) [hereinafter Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society].
29. Id.
30. Id. at 115.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-5\COL506.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-MAY-05 11:24
1642 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1635
that good moral character is not a necessary element of well-being, it may
be possible for us to suffer moral harm.31
The concept of moral harm is a strange one from the perspective of
much contemporary moral philosophy.  Joel Feinberg, for example, ob-
jects that “[m]orally corrupting a person, that is, causing him to be a
worse person than he would otherwise be, can harm him . . . only if he has
an antecedent interest in being good.”32  Clor responds that if Feinberg is
right, then all effort by educators of children to promote children’s
moral development should be understood to be a raw exercise of power,
not even justifiable on paternalistic grounds.  “On this view of what moral
education means, ‘it’s for your own good’ could only be a falsehood or a
kind of myth, the truthful translation of which would be ‘because that’s
how we want it.’”33
Feinberg’s understanding of well-being as the satisfaction of subjec-
tive desire, with no external standard against which to judge that desire, is
of a piece with the idea that obscenity is of concern only to the extent
that it is likely to produce antisocial conduct.  Both manifest the tendency
of many modern moral philosophers, noted by Charles Taylor, “to focus
on what it is right to do rather than on what it is good to be, on defining
the content of obligation rather than the nature of the good life.”34
What this tendency obscures from view is a central element of ordinary
moral reasoning, which Taylor calls “strong evaluation.”  Such evaluation
involves “discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or
lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or
choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by
which they can be judged.”35  A person who did not make any such dis-
criminations, a “simple weigher of alternatives,”36 would be a very strange
31. For now, this Essay will defer the question of whether, even if moral harm exists, it
can be caused by sexually arousing publications.
32. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others 70 (1984).
33. Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society, supra note 28, at 113.  This is not, of R
course, a refutation of Feinberg’s claim.  Such a refutation would require a conclusive
answer to the ancient question, posed but not resolved in Book I of Plato’s Republic, of
whether a person is better off if he has a good character.  That question continues to be
debated by philosophers.  On the other hand, it is answered on an existential level by
parents every day when they try to develop their children’s moral character on the
assumption that to neglect this task would wrong the children.  On the norms implicit in
parenting practice, see Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking:  Toward a Politics of Peace
(1989).  The objection to Feinberg is that actual human practice is inconsistent with
Feinberg’s degree of agnosticism about human interests.  It is unlikely that Feinberg was so
noncommittal when he raised his own children.  Thanks to John Deigh for pressing me on
this issue.
34. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self:  The Making of the Modern Identity 3 (1989)
[hereinafter Taylor, Sources].
35. Id. at 4.
36. 1 Charles Taylor, What is Human Agency?, in Philosophical Papers:  Human
Agency and Language 15, 23 (1985).
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sort of person; it is not clear whether there could be a person so lacking
in depth.37
Another way of putting the point is to say that some of our desires
and feelings are “import-attributing”:  They hold that “some goals,
desires, allegiances are central to what we are, while others are not or are
less so.”38  Because these attributions are claims about value, they are ca-
pable of being mistaken.  But this means that a person could be mistaken
about his fundamental purposes.39  If A were to induce B to make such a
mistake, this would harm B even if B did not complain about it.  It would
impair B’s ability to discern the morally better from the morally worse.
This is a kind of moral harm.  B has an interest in having good moral
capacities whether he knows it or not.
C. When Reading Is Bad for You
Even if moral harm exists, how could a photograph or a movie cause
such harm?  Justice Burger thinks that the harm caused by obscene books
is somehow analogous to the benefit caused by good books.  But what
good are good books?
1. Nonce Beliefs and Fixed Norms. — Any work of literature promotes
certain desires and projects in the reader.  Wayne Booth observes that
narratives, when we are paying attention to them, tend to reshape us.  As
we read “a large part of our thought-stream is taken over, for at least the
duration of the telling, by the story we are taking in.”40  Any text will
imply an author, possibly different from the real historical author, whose
presence can be felt by the reader.41  As I read, my thinking becomes that
of the implied author:  “I begin to see as he or she sees, to feel as she
feels, to love what he loves, or to mock what she mocks.”42  The best nar-
ratives are morally useful precisely because they “introduce us to the prac-
37. Id. at 28; Taylor, Sources, supra note 34, at 27.  Even utilitarians who are officially R
committed to such simple weighing tend to be animated by motives of a loftier sort; they
cannot account for their own existence.  See id. at 76–86, 322–40.
38. 2 Charles Taylor, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in Philosophical Papers:
Philosophy and the Human Sciences 211, 224 (1985).
39. Taylor offers two illustrations of persons who are thus fundamentally mistaken:
multiple murderer Charles Manson and terrorist Andreas Baader.  Id. at 227.  “And once
we recognize such extreme cases, how avoid admitting that the rest of mankind can suffer
to a lesser degree from the same disabilities?”  Id.  But these examples, both violent
criminals, provide us with no guidance as to how we can extend the analysis to less extreme
cases.  Still, once the principle is established, it opens the possibility of a response to
Feinberg.
40. Wayne C. Booth, The Company We Keep:  An Ethics of Fiction 141 (1988)
[hereinafter Booth, The Company We Keep]; see also Wayne C. Booth, “Of the Standard
of Moral Taste”:  Literary Criticism as Moral Inquiry, in In Face of the Facts:  Moral Inquiry
in American Scholarship 149, 167–77 (Richard Wightman Fox & Robert B. Westbrook
eds., 1998).
41. On the idea of the implied author, see Wayne C. Booth, A Rhetoric of Fiction
67–77 (2d. ed. 1983) [hereinafter Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction].
42. Booth, The Company We Keep, supra note 40, at 256. R
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tice of subtle, sensitive moral inference, the kind that most moral choices
in daily life require of us.”43  Morally bad literature is literature that
promulgates morally bad fixed norms.
The “facts” that we take in when we read a narrative are of two kinds,
Booth argues.  One is “nonce beliefs,” which the reader embraces only
for the duration of the story:  “Once upon a time there was a farmer who
had the good fortune to possess a goose that laid a golden egg every
day . . . .”  But any story will also depend for its effect on “fixed norms,”
which are “beliefs on which the narrative depends for its effect but which
also are by implication applicable in the ‘real’ world.”44  When Aesop
concludes the goose story with the claim that “overweening greed loses
all,” the reader is meant to keep thinking that once the story is over.  And
the point applies to all fictions, whether or not they have overt morals as
Aesop’s do.  These fixed norms may be good or malign. King Lear, Oliver
Twist, and Midnight Cowboy “depend upon and reinforce, among other
fixed norms, the enormous value of simple kindness and the awfulness of
gratuitous cruelty.”45 Don Giovanni, A Farewell to Arms, and Gargantua “de-
pend upon and reinforce (in different degrees, to be sure, and among
many other fixed norms) the conviction of the male world that women
are artistically expendable, at most a kind of attractive backdrop against
which the comedy or tragedy of men’s fate can play itself out.”46
2. It Is Not About Consequences. — The inappropriateness of focusing
only on the consequences of narrative, rather than on the moral dimen-
sions of narrative itself, is made clearer in a little parable by Iris Murdoch
in her 1971 book, The Sovereignty of Good.47  Murdoch was trying to refute
a school of moral philosophy that concerned itself only with the appropri-
ateness of conduct, and which was entirely indifferent to people’s inter-
nal mental states.  But her tale can also show how a narrative can be good
or bad without having good or bad behavioral effects.
A woman, M, feels hostile toward her daughter-in-law, D.  M thinks
that her son has married beneath him, and finds D unrefined, brusque,
and rude.  However, M always behaves beautifully toward D, and keeps
her real opinion well concealed.  Then suppose that the young couple
emigrates, or D dies, so that whatever happens after that happens only in
M’s mind.  M, moved only by love for her son and a desire to be just, now
reflects on D.  She concludes that D has many good qualities that M had
failed to appreciate:  She is not undignified but spontaneous, not vulgar
but refreshingly simple, and so on.  In the course of these reflections,
Murdoch insists, M has been “active, she has been doing something, some-
thing which we approve of, something which is somehow worth doing in
43. Id. at 287.
44. Id. at 142–43.
45. Id. at 152.
46. Id.
47. Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good 19 (1971).
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itself.”48  M’s activity of trying to see D accurately is a moral activity, and
perhaps the necessary substrate of any further moral activity.49
Morality, Murdoch claims, is inseparable from accurate perception.
“The more the separateness and differentness of other people is realized,
and the fact seen that another man has needs and wishes as demanding
as one’s own, the harder it becomes to treat a person as a thing.”50  On
the other hand, Murdoch writes that the chief enemy of morality is “per-
sonal fantasy:  the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and
dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one.”51
Moral harm may be understood, following Murdoch, precisely as suc-
cumbing to that kind of fantasy—which is not the same thing as entertain-
ing, as a nonce belief, any particular type of fantasy.  The best art, Mur-
doch argues, is that which “shows us the world, our world and not
another one, with a clarity which startles and delights us simply because
we are not used to looking at the real world at all.”52
Another instance of moral harm is revealed in Ted Cohen’s analysis
of jokes.53  All jokes, Cohen argues, are conditional on some preexisting
knowledge that is shared by teller and audience.  Here is one of his illus-
trations, which is perceived as funny only if the audience knows a little
about drama:
A panhandler approached a man on the street outside a theater.  The
man declined to give anything, saying, “ ‘Neither a borrower nor a lender
be.’—William Shakespeare.”
The panhandler replied, “ ‘Fuck you!’—David Mamet.”54
Any joke depends on and calls attention to what the audience al-
ready knows and feels.  Cohen claims that “a deep satisfaction in success-
ful joke transactions is the sense held mutually by teller and hearer that
they are joined in feeling.”55  When you tell me a joke and hope that I
find it funny, “what you want is to reach me, and therein to verify that you
understand me, at least a little, which is to exhibit that we are, at least a
little, alike.  This is the establishment of a felt intimacy between us.”56
When a joke works it creates a community of persons who are united
both by knowledge and by feeling.
Cohen ends his book with a consideration of the morality of joking,
with special attention to the problem of racist jokes.  The following is one
that Cohen finds especially disturbing:
48. Id.
49. Murdoch’s conception of morality as dependent on accurate perception is
persuasively elaborated in Christopher Cordner, Ethical Encounter:  The Depth of Moral
Meaning (2002).  Thanks to Nancy Koppelman for directing my attention to this book.
50. Murdoch, supra note 47, at 66. R
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. at 65.
53. Ted Cohen, Jokes:  Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters (1999).
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 25.
56. Id. at 29.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-5\COL506.txt unknown Seq: 12 19-MAY-05 11:24
1646 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1635
How did a passerby stop a group of black men from committing a gang
rape?
He threw them a basketball.57
It is possible, but unprovable, that such jokes cause racist beliefs and
behaviors.  But the jokes would still be troubling even if they had no such
causal effects.  And Cohen is not sure why this is so.  He has been amused
by the joke, and yet he is disturbed by it.  Booth’s analysis can solve Co-
hen’s puzzle.  The basketball joke presupposes that neither teller nor lis-
tener is black, that both understand black men to be interested in little
beside basketball and sex, and that those who know this are better and
smarter than the black men.58  The joke’s funniness is just what makes it
so disturbing.  When I laugh, I succumb to the joke, and in that moment
the joke’s racist fixed norms become my norms.  I am constituted, in the
moment of laughter, as a member of a racist community.  And that is not
a good thing to be.59
3. Posner’s Objection. — A prominent critic of obscenity law, Judge
Richard Posner, denies Burger’s premise that good literature can im-
prove us, and so questions whether bad literature can make us worse.
“[I]mmersion in literature does not make us better citizens or better peo-
ple.”60  Professors of literature are not morally superior to other people,
and Nazi Germany was more cultured than the United States was in the
1940s.
Posner does not, however, deny that literature has effects on its
readers.
[L]iterature continues to be an important component of high-
school and college education because of its effects in stretching
the student’s imagination, multiplying his cultural perspectives,
broadening his intellectual and emotional horizons, offering
him a range of vicarious experiences, and assisting him to read
57. Id. at 77.
58. However, sometimes the teller or listener or both will be black, in which case a
different analysis would apply.  Thanks to Richard Posner for pointing this out.
59. The critique of pornography developed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin also claims constitutive harm, but of a different kind:  They claim that
pornography constitutes sexuality, of a particularly malign kind.  While MacKinnon and
Dworkin often enlist consequentialist arguments, such arguments are not their main
claims.  See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., To “Deprave and Corrupt,” 38 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 401,
433–37 (1993) (book review).  The analogous claim about racist jokes would be that such
jokes constitute what it is to be a black person in American society.  In both cases, one must
beware of exaggerating the cultural power of any particular set of representations; but
representations taken as a whole do constitute the world we inhabit.  The type of moral
criticism of texts that MacKinnon and Dworkin (and, in a different way, Clor) advocate is
important, even if they are mistaken in trying to enlist the law to enforce their judgments.
60. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature:  A Misunderstood Relation 306 (1998)
[hereinafter Posner, Law and Literature].  The prohibition of pornography, of course,
makes no sense at all to Posner.  See id. at 333–38; Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason
351–82 (1992).
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difficult texts, express complex thoughts, and write and speak
persuasively.61
The coexistence of these passages in Posner’s work leads Booth to
conclude that there are two Posners, one who rules out all ethical ques-
tions from aesthetic judgment and another who repeatedly engages in
ethical criticism.62  Posner responds that “Booth defines ‘ethical’ so
broadly that it largely overlaps what I consider ‘aesthetic.’”63  But it ap-
pears that Posner’s understanding of the ethical is confined in just the
way that Murdoch is attacking.  If the educational process that Posner
describes did not make the student a better person, then why require the
student to endure it?  Posner appears to have a richer and more complex
conception of well-being than his stated position will allow, and that con-
ception entails the possibility of subtler forms of moral corruption than
those he considers.
III. RECOGNIZING MORAL HARM
Even if moral harm is a coherent concept that describes a real evil, it
does not follow that law can or should do anything about it.  The large
difficulty—one that, this Essay shall eventually argue, is fatal—is using
this concept to define a workable legal standard.  What is the pertinent
characteristic of literature that entitles the law to conclude that it is mor-
ally harmful and therefore should be denominated obscene?
This Part shall examine several characteristics that might be thought
to make literature morally harmful:  the reduction of human beings to
objects, the tendency of sexual arousal to distort people’s discernment
and judgment, damage to children’s moral development, offensiveness,
the alleged worthlessness of sexual fantasy, the association of sex with vio-
lence, and the factors singled out by the Supreme Court in the Miller test.
None of them, I conclude, provides a legal standard that enables the
courts to recognize moral harm.
A. Objectification
A common theme in arguments about the debasing effect of obscen-
ity is that it reduces people to the level of objects.  Thus, Clor argues that
pornography “dehumanizes in an area of great human importance and
some sensitivity.”64  It “obliterates the distinction between human and
subhuman sexuality.”65  “The purpose—to arouse an elemental passion
for other people’s bodies independently of any affection or regard for a
particular person—virtually guarantees that human beings will be repre-
61. Posner, Law and Literature, supra note 60, at 335. R
62. Wayne C. Booth, Why Banning Ethical Criticism Is a Serious Mistake, 22 Phil. &
Literature 366, 366–67 (1998).
63. Richard A. Posner, Against Ethical Criticism:  Part Two, 22 Phil. & Literature 394,
395 (1998).
64. Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society, supra note 28, at 192. R
65. Id. at 187.
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sented as instruments.”66  Citizens cannot respect one another while view-
ing each other “pornographically, or as mere objects and opportunities
for self-gratification.”67  If this is what is wrong with pornography, then it
is a mistake, Clor argues, for some feminists to try to salvage certain erotic
materials that supposedly do not degrade women.  “They condemn ‘ob-
jectification’ while apparently validating representations of a sort that in-
evitably objectify.”68  To appropriate Booth’s terms, Clor’s claim is that
pornography inevitably incorporates fixed norms that are morally bad,
that regard people as mere objects.69
This focus on sexual objectification as the core wrong of pornogra-
phy is common ground among pornography’s critics on the right (such
as Clor) and the left (such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dwor-
kin).  These writers’ case, however, has been weakened by their imprecise
use of the term “objectification.”  Just what is it and why is it bad?
Martha Nussbaum has offered the most careful analysis of the con-
cept of objectification.70  She concludes that it refers to a number of dis-
tinct ways of treating a person like a thing:  as an instrument, as lacking in
autonomy, as lacking in agency, as interchangeable with other objects, as
lacking in boundary integrity, as something that can be owned, or as
something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into
account.71  Not all of these are morally objectionable per se.  Sound eval-
uation of each is heavily dependent on the context in which it takes
place.  What is always morally wrong is the instrumental treatment of
human beings as mere tools for the purposes of another “if it does not
take place in a larger context of regard for humanity.”72
Although Nussbaum’s argument is the most specific indictment of
pornography,73 it needs further specification.  Briefly, the malign sexual
objectification she describes has two characteristic forms.  With one of
them, the morally malign character is a contingent danger.  With the
other, it is intrinsic.
66. Id. at 191–92.
67. Id. at 68.
68. Id. at 196.
69. The similarity between Booth’s approach and Clor’s is particularly evident in Clor,
Obscenity and Public Morality, supra note 25, at 242–45, where it is apparent that Clor’s R
core concern is the fixed norms reflected in obscenity.
70. Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, in Sex and Social Justice 213 (1999)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Objectification].
71. Id. at 213, 238.
72. Id.
73. It is not, however, offered as a justification for obscenity law.  The law’s inevitable
clumsiness leads her, in her study of objectification, to conclude that there should be no
legal restrictions on such work, because “it would be ill administered in practice and would
jeopardize expressive interests that it is important to protect.”  Id. at 234.  In more recent
work, Nussbaum has further criticized obscenity law for relying on disgust toward the
female body, but she has also become less firm in her rejection of censorship.  Martha C.
Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity:  Disgust, Shame, and the Law 134–47 (2004)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity].
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The first sort of objectification will here be called “self-centered-
ness.”  It occurs when one is so focused on one’s own gratification that all
interest in the subjectivities of others is lost.  Kant, who is the most
profound ancestor of both the authors of pornography laws and their
libertarian critics, worried that sex is always self-centered in this way.  Sen-
sations of sexual pleasure focus attention on one’s own bodily states and
drive out of one’s mind all considerations of the experience of the part-
ner, at least until the act is concluded.74  Kant thought the problem is
solved by the institution of marriage,75 in which each partner pledges a
permanent tie to the other, but this does not solve his core difficulty.
Perhaps mutual commitment guarantees a certain kind of respect, but it
is hard to see how this respect could eliminate the objectifying character
of the sexual act itself.  The part of sex that Kant worried about cannot be
expunged.  Nussbaum recognizes this, but worries that, when “[u]sed as a
masturbatory aid,” pornography “encourages the idea that an easy satis-
faction can be had in this uncomplicated way, without the difficulties at-
tendant on recognizing women’s subjectivity and autonomy in a more
full-blooded way.”76
The second sort of objectification, which will be called “cruelty,” has
a different flavor altogether.  What Nussbaum finds described in the
novels of Hankinson and James is not merely instrumentalization and de-
nial of subjectivity.  The desire Hankinson describes “would not have
been satisfied by intercourse with a corpse, or even an animal.”77  The
sexy thing is “the act of turning a creature whom in one dim corner of
one’s mind one knows to be human into a thing, a something rather than
a someone.”78  This form of objectification is not well captured in Kant-
ian terms.  We need instead to look to the master-slave dialectic of
74. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics 162–68 (Louis Infield trans., 1930); Barbara
Herman, Could It Be Worth Thinking About Kant on Sex and Marriage?, in A Mind of
One’s Own:  Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity 53, 59–65 (Louise M. Antony &
Charlotte E. Witt eds., 2d ed. 2002); Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 224. R
75. Kant, supra note 74, at 167–68. R
76. Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 235.  Here Nussbaum cites with R
approval Alison Assiter, Autonomy and Pornography, in Feminist Perspectives in
Philosophy 58 (Morwenna Griffiths & Margaret Whitford eds., 1988).  Nussbaum claims
that “of course, none of these arguments entails moral criticism of masturbation.”
Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 428 n.56.  Elsewhere she insists on the R
importance and omnipresence of sexual fantasy.  Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of
Thought:  The Intelligence of Emotions 696–97 (2001).  Assiter, however, thinks that
pornographic fantasies, precisely because they involve fantasized objects that are not
autonomous, reinforce men’s desires for women who are not autonomous.  Assiter, supra,
at 67–68.  If an object’s lack of autonomy constitutes bad sexuality, then it is hard to see
how any sexual fantasy can escape condemnation.  No object of sexual fantasy can be
autonomous.
77. Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 233. R
78. Id.
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Hegel’s Phenomenology,79 or the war of consciousnesses detailed by
Sartre.80
Eroticization of cruelty may lead to cruel behavior.81  In laboratory
experiments, portrayals of violent sex induce some viewers to be more
accepting of such behavior.82  Perhaps these viewers are thereby made
more likely to engage in sexual assault; nobody knows for sure.  That is,
however, not the only harm at issue.  A Hegelian master is simply not a
good thing to be.
The same point can be made about the very common hybrid case,
partaking of both self-centeredness and cruelty, in which men treat wo-
men as “a prize possession, an object whose presence in their lives, and
whose sexual interest in them, enhances their status in the world of
men.”83  This kind of script is not necessarily sadistic.  It can even be
friendly.  But it has a distinctively Hegelian dimension.
Sometimes, however, pornography’s readers are merely self-cen-
tered.  Self-centeredness is not always evil; it depends on whether some-
one else’s valid claims are being neglected by the self-centered activity.  A
woman is not a thing, but a photograph of a woman is.  Kurt Vonnegut
writes that what pornography has in common with some science fiction is
“fantasies of an impossibly hospitable world.”84  What is hospitable about
the fantasized world is precisely the ease of satisfaction, to which other
subjectivities always constitute something of an obstacle.  Self-centered-
ness can produce malign behavior, in the same way that one’s rational
79. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) [hereinafter
Hegel, Phenomenology].
80. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness:  A Phenomenological Essay on
Ontology (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).  Put very briefly, Hegel thought that persons
desire to be recognized and respected, and that the most primitive manifestation of this
desire is the effort to subjugate and enslave the other.  See Hegel, Phenomenology, supra
note 79, at 111–16; G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind 170–74 (William Wallace trans., R
1971) [hereinafter Hegel, Philosophy].  But this strategy is self-defeating, because
recognition is worthless unless it comes from another free being.  One cannot get
recognition from a thing.  Hegel thus thought that true recognition was only possible in
conditions of equality.  See Hegel, Phenomenology, supra note 79, at 116–19; Hegel, R
Philosophy, supra, at 174–78.  Sartre was more pessimistic, concluding that the gulf
between self and other is unbridgeable, and that relationships therefore are characterized
by an unavoidable hostility, which even the enslavement of the other cannot assuage.  See
Sartre, supra, at 358, 478–82; see also Andrew Koppelman, Sex Equality and/or the Family:
From Bloom vs. Okin to Rousseau vs. Hegel, 4 Yale J.L. & Human. 399, 416–17, 427–28
(1992) (book review).  The comparison with Hegel and Sartre is mine and not
Nussbaum’s.
81. The emphasis here is on “may.”  Sadomasochists in fact tend to follow careful
protocols for ensuring safety and verifying consent, which the mainstream community
would do well to emulate.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylaw:  Challenging the
Apartheid of the Closet 254–57, 259–63 (1999).
82. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. R
83. Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 235. R
84. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater or Pearls before Swine 20 (Dell
1970) (1965).
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desire to maximize one’s wealth can lead one to steal.  But it does not
follow that the desire for wealth is per se bad.  Similarly, the objectifica-
tion in pornography is not per se bad.  Everything depends on the con-
text within which the fantasy is taking place.85
Clor would doubtless respond that Nussbaum has misapprehended
the harm from pornography.  Pornography treats human beings as if they
were animals with animal appetites, induces its viewers to think of them-
selves that way, and so brutalizes and debases them.  The problem is not
ameliorated by treating the debased person as one whose desires matter.
Even if you are kind to an animal, you are not treating it as human.  But
people are animals.  Sexual need is part of what makes us human.
Lust depersonalizes, but it also personalizes.  When I am the object
of lust, this sometimes means that I am appreciated in the full embodied
particularity of my self, as I am not if you only love me for my mind.86  A
person is dehumanized in a distinctive way if she is never the object of
anyone’s lust.87
The precise letting go, in sex, of one’s sober self-control that Kant
feared is what D.H. Lawrence thought particularly valuable about sex,
and Nussbaum takes Lawrence’s part in the argument.88  This is the larg-
est disagreement between Nussbaum and Clor.  The huge question that
Clor leaves unanswered is whether sexuality is redeemable on his terms,
or whether his view, like Kant’s, logically must condemn sex as such.
85. One possible kind of moral harm happens when a reader becomes so transfixed
by pornography as to lose all interest in relationships with actual people, and there is
anecdotal evidence that this sometimes happens.  See M. Douglas Reed, Pornography
Addiction and Compulsive Sexual Behavior, in Media, Children, and the Family:  Social
Scientific, Psychodynamic, and Clinical Perspectives 249 (Dolf Zillmann et al. eds., 1994).
Thomas Laqueur argues that the fear of such social withdrawal is what really animated the
masturbation scare that lasted from the early eighteenth century to the present.  See
Laqueur, supra note 21, at 249, 267–68.  That same fear has now changed its object, and R
focuses on illegal drugs, such as marijuana.  See Andrew Koppelman, Drug Policy and the
Liberal Self, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005).  This kind of solitary obsessiveness is
not unique to pornography.  It occurs with many activities that are usually harmless.  The
concept of “pornography addiction” is a dubious one that has not survived scientific
scrutiny.  See Martin P. Levine & Richard R. Troiden, The Myth of Sexual Compulsivity, 26
J. Sex Res. 347 (1988).
86. See Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire:  A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic 68–76
(1986).
87. The point is nicely made in Tony Kushner’s depiction, in his play Angels in
America, of the disintegration of Harper as she becomes aware that her husband Joe (who,
there is no doubt, really loves her) is gay and has never felt any sexual desire for her.  See
Tony Kushner, Angels in America:  A Gay Fantasia on National Themes (1995).
88. See Nussbaum, Objectification, supra note 70, at 228–31. R
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B. The Power of Sex
The wrongs of cruelty and indifference have no direct connection to
sexual representations, but sex is a necessary element of unprotected ob-
scenity.89  Why should that be so?
It is a commonplace idea among opponents of obscenity that sexual-
ity has a powerful tendency to distort our powers of perception and judg-
ment.  Clor’s concerns have already been noted.  Catharine MacKinnon
argues that “because pornography is sexual, it is not like the literatures of
other inequalities.  It is a specific and compelling behavioral stimulus,
conditioner, and reinforcer.”90  If the claim is taken to be that pornogra-
phy incites crime, we have already noted the difficulty:  There is little evi-
dence that this is true.  The problem is rather that obscenity induces its
consumers to entertain morally bad fixed norms.  This much is common
ground between conservatives such as Clor and feminists such as MacKin-
non, though they have different fixed norms in mind:  Clor worries about
lust separated from affection, while MacKinnon worries about lust con-
nected with cruelty toward women.  The problem is similar to that of ra-
cist jokes.  To the extent that the reader succumbs to the narrative, he
becomes complicit in the narrative’s fixed norms.  Sexual arousal is an
especially profound way to succumb.
This, however, is only to say that the rhetorical appeal of a text that
promotes bad fixed norms may be greater if the text is sexually arousing.
An arousing text that does not promote bad fixed norms will be harmless,
perhaps even valuable.  Sex itself is not the problem.
C. Protecting Children
The idea of a distinctly sexual type of moral harm may make sense of
another puzzle in the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence:  the rule that
states may prohibit sales of nonobscene sexual materials to minors.  Con-
cern about harm to minors has always been central to obscenity law,
though the conception of harm has shifted over time.91  Here, again, the
Supreme Court has explained itself only once, in the 1968 decision Gins-
89. The Court has said that depiction of “excretory functions” can also be obscene,
but it is not clear that it has in mind any nonsexual depictions.  At any rate, there is no
market for depictions of excretion except for a specialized audience that finds such
depictions sexually arousing.
90. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 200 (1987) [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified]; accord Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First
Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 606–08.
91. See generally Kendrick, supra note 19.  This concern is now most manifest in the R
burgeoning law of child pornography, which is so determined to maintain a wedge
between children and sexuality that it now sweeps within its net any image of a child that
some pedophile might find arousing.  See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1029 (2000); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1109 (1995).  See generally Amy Adler, Inverting the First
Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921 (2001); Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child
Pornography, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 209 (2001).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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berg v. New York.92  The Court observed that most parents did not want
their children to see these publications, and the legislature could appro-
priately wish to help those parents.  (Parents who felt differently could
purchase the magazines for their children.)  But the Court also cited the
state’s “independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”93  It did not
specify just what harm the state was preventing, and the most articulate
source it quoted emphasized
a distinction between the reading of pornography, as unlikely to
be per se harmful, and the permitting of the reading of pornog-
raphy, which was conceived as potentially destructive.  The child
is protected in his reading of pornography by the knowledge
that it is pornographic, i.e., disapproved.  It is outside of paren-
tal standards and not a part of his identification processes.  To
openly permit implies parental approval and even suggests se-
ductive encouragement.  If this is so of parental approval, it is
equally so of societal approval—another potent influence on the
developing ego.94
Here the Court nearly admitted that these laws are ineffectual and that
children will get their hands on pornography anyway.95  But it also indi-
cated that this would not be so bad so long as the materials were nomi-
nally prohibited.
The harm pornography does to its young readers evidently is not
caused by the materials themselves, but rather by the materials in a cer-
tain context.  The context, the Court thinks, should be one in which the
readers do not take away the wrong fixed norms.  What matters is the
child’s “identification processes.”96  The law prohibits the sale of porno-
92. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
93. Id. at 640.
94. Id. at 642 n.10 (quoting Willard M. Gaylin, The Prickly Problems of Pornography,
77 Yale L.J. 579, 594 (1968) (book review)).
95. Two years after Ginsberg, the President’s Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography found that “[r]oughly 80% of boys and 70% of girls have seen visual
depictions or read textual descriptions of sexual intercourse by the time they reach age 18”
and that “[m]ore than half of boys have had some exposure to explicit sexual materials by
age 15.”  Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 25 (1970); see also 6
Technical Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 8 (1970) (reporting
age breakdowns from ages 12–21 for both males and females).
No additional data was collected by the Attorney General’s Commission on
Pornography.  The commission’s report states, vaguely, that “from an early age American
children are bombarded by very stimulating sexual messages,” Attorney Gen.’s Comm’n on
Pornography, Final Report 209 (1986), and that “too many young people get too much of
their sex education from pornographic magazines and films,” id. at 210, but it later
acknowledged that no comparable age-of-first-exposure question was asked in any of the
research it relied on, and fell back on the 1970 data, see id. at 912–16.
A 1989 study found that 92% of males and 84% of females had seen Playboy or Playgirl
magazines by age 15.  Dan Brown & Jennings Bryant, Uses of Pornography, in
Pornography:  Research Advances and Policy Considerations 45 (Dolf Zillmann & Jennings
Bryant eds., 1989).  All of these numbers are somewhat out of date, but it is hard to
imagine that they could have recently gone anywhere but up.
96. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 n.10.
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graphy to children, not in the expectation that it will keep the stuff out of
their hands, but in order to express its moral stance.97  The concern is
not inducement of bad conduct, but moral harm.  And if some porno-
graphic material—that denominated “obscene”—is prohibited for adults
as well, can we not infer that this is because adults may be harmed in just
the same way?
D. The Relevance of Offensiveness
Thus far this Essay has neglected an important element of obscenity
doctrine.  The Miller test requires that the material be “patently offen-
sive,”98 and it looks to community standards to determine what is offen-
sive.  Does this not show that the doctrine is concerned, not with moral
harm, but with offense?
Offense can be understood two ways.  One of these treats offense as a
primitive emotion, not reducible to any more basic elements.  The other
understanding of offense is parasitic on an idea of moral harm.
If one understands the harm of pornography as raw offense, then
the law is making exorbitant demands on pornography’s consumers.
This is an idea of offense that is not satisfied by merely shielding the
unwilling from unwanted sights, since obscenity doctrine permits the sup-
pression of even publications mailed in plain envelopes whose contents
are unknown to anyone but the recipient.  Even if I am distressed by
“what is commonly read and seen and heard and done”99 by my neigh-
bors behind closed doors, it hardly follows that my distress caused by that
mere knowledge, without more, should trump their interest in their pri-
vate lives.100  Offense may justify laws against mailing unsolicited sexual
material, or zoning restrictions on sexually oriented bookstores and thea-
ters, but obscenity law outruns this justification.
The other way of understanding offense is as a reflection of a view
about morality.  On this account, public decency laws, for example, give
the majority’s preferences force, not only because of their intensity, but
also because they are thought to represent a correct moral view.101  A
similar perspective appears to inform obscenity law.  When the law inter-
dicts what can be mailed in unmarked envelopes, it is paternalizing con-
97. The expression of a message is a legitimate reason for a law (or, in some contexts,
for objecting to a law).  See Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured
Endorsement, 60 Md. L. Rev. 713, 717–36 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, On the Moral
Foundations of Legal Expressivism, 60 Md. L. Rev. 777 (2001).
98. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
99. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59 (1973) (quoting Alexander Bickel,
On Pornography:  Dissenting and Concurring Opinions, Pub. Int., Winter 1971, at 25, 26).
100. See Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 55–64 (1988).
101. For discussion of this understanding of offense, see Clor, Public Morality and
Liberal Society, supra note 28, at 103–10; Larry Alexander, Harm, Offense, and Morality, 7 R
Can. J.L. & Jurisprudence 199, 201 (1994); Larry Alexander, The Legal Enforcement of
Morality, in A Companion to Applied Ethics 128, 136–40 (R.G. Frey & Christopher Heath
Wellman eds., 2003).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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sumers, and then one may reasonably ask what interest of the consumer is
being served by the paternalism.  We are back to the idea of moral harm.
Offense matters, then, as an indicator of the moral views of the perti-
nent community. Miller can be understood, in part, as a response to cul-
tural heterogeneity.  Different communities have different moral views,
and “[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept
public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York
City.”102 Miller permits each community to try to prevent what it under-
stands to be moral harm.
This solution is consistent with the idea of federalism as one re-
sponse to deep moral disagreement:  Different regions can hold different
moral views, and no one of these views can be forced upon the nation as a
whole.  But, of course, there is another possible response to moral disa-
greement:  the idea of the sovereign individual, who cannot be bullied
out of his views even by an entire community.  The Court, somewhat inco-
herently, tossed a small bit of consolation to the individual who lives in a
conservative community.  In Stanley v. Georgia, it held that “the mere pri-
vate possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a
crime.”103  The Court offered a sweeping declaration of the freedom of
the mind:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch.  Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving govern-
ment the power to control men’s minds.104
Two years later, in United States v. Reidel, the Court made clear that Stanley
did not call into question the validity of laws prohibiting distribution of
obscenity.105 Stanley, it held, focused “on freedom of mind and thought
and on the privacy of one’s home,”106 and these interests were not impli-
cated in commercial distribution.  The result is strange:  The individual
has a right to view obscenity in his home, but the law can punish virtually
every means of obtaining the material.107 Stanley is best understood as a
102. Miller, 413 U.S. at 32.
103. 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969).
104. Id. at 565.
105. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
106. Id.
107. This conclusion has recently been challenged by a federal district court, which
held that privacy claims under substantive due process have been strengthened by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating a statute that criminalized
homosexual sodomy), and that obscenity laws are now unconstitutional when deployed to
prevent private consumption at home.  United States v. Extreme Assoc., Inc. 352 F. Supp.
2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005).  It remains to be seen whether this unusual holding survives on
appeal.  For a different reading of Lawrence, see Andrew Koppelman, Lawrence’s Penumbra,
88 Minn. L. Rev. 1171 (2004).  If the decision is sustained on appeal, then of course we
would be in a completely different world:  Obscenity would still be officially unprotected by
the First Amendment, but prosecutions for obscenity would become effectively impossible
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very limited concession to the individualistic philosophy that obscenity
law as a whole rejects.108
E. The Clumsy Miller Standard
The Court’s analogy to good literature, its concern with crass affect,
and its notion that sex is somehow uniquely vulnerable are all now clear.
If one wanted a litmus test for morally bad pornography, it would be this:
The text’s fixed norms regard people as mere objects of sexual interest, whose feelings
and desires do not matter. Such fixed norms might be what Burger had in
mind when he denounced “crass commercial exploitation of sex.”109  But
this concern is not identical to, and only fortuitously overlaps with, con-
cern about the dissemination of any particular image or subject matter.
The Miller test addresses longstanding problems of vagueness by de-
claring that any obscenity statute must specifically define the conduct that
may not be depicted, and offers as an example “[p]atently offensive rep-
resentations or descriptions” of “ultimate sexual acts, normal or per-
verted, actual or simulated,” and “masturbation, excretory functions, and
lewd exhibition of the genitals.”110  Justice Brennan reportedly relied on
what his clerks called the “limp dick” standard, according to which a work
was obscene if, and only if, it showed an erect penis.111  But some pretty
nasty materials would pass any of these tests, and some much more innoc-
uous stuff would flunk them.112
The most widely available pornographic materials are those that eas-
ily satisfy the Miller standard, preeminently Playboy magazine.113  The lack
for any defendant who exercised reasonable care to shield children and unconsenting
adults from the merchandise.
108. One could also understand this line of cases as an illustration of path
dependency:  The later courts, composed of less liberal justices, disagreed with Stanley and
would not have decided it the same way, so they confined it to its specific holding.  But this
does not explain why Stanley has not been overruled.
109. Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).  This may also explain
why the Court was willing to criminalize the “pandering” of otherwise nonobscene
material, through advertising permeated by “the leer of the sensualist,” in Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1966).  Justice Scalia has relied entirely on Ginzburg
when claiming that states may entirely ban sexually oriented bookstores, even if the
material they sell is not obscene.  See City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct.
2219, 2228 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 250–64 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
111. Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren:  Inside the Supreme Court
194 (1979).
112. Clor understands the intensely contextual judgments involved in the
determination that a work of literature is obscene, but leaps without much argument to the
conclusion that these can be shoehorned into a brief legal definition.  See Clor, Obscenity
and Public Morality, supra note 25, at 210–45. R
113. According to Ulrich’s Periodicals Directory, in the United States Playboy has a
current circulation of 3,150,000; among its principal competitors, Hustler’s circulation is
1,000,000, and that of Penthouse, 980,106.  Ulrich’s Periodical Directory:  Playboy, at http:/
/www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/Search/fullCitation.asp?navPage=1&tab=1&serial_uid=
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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of fit between the Miller standard and the concern about objectification is
nicely epitomized in one of Playboy’s publications, on newsstands in mid-
2003, titled Playboy’s Exotic Beauties.  The magazine (subtitled “Hot Girls
With a Spicy Kick!”) is, like most of Playboy’s material, the softest of soft
core porn.  It consists entirely of naked women posing for the camera.
There is no sadism, no feces or urine, no sex act of any kind.  On the
other hand, what makes the women “exotic”?  You guessed it:  None of
them are white.  The narrative that constructs women of color as a sort of
sexual forest primeval, a distant erotic vacation Disneyland from which a
man can shortly return to civilization, is one of the most malign and de-
structive sexual scripts that we have inherited.114  There is room for argu-
ment about whether that is what is going on here; obviously not only
racists are attracted to women of color.  Resolving this question would
require a close reading of the magazine, which is beyond the scope of this
Essay.  But even if the magazine were flagrantly racist, that still wouldn’t
make it obscene.
Booth observes that our understanding of any text develops and
changes in conversation with others.115  I was moved to tears by that film,
but you’ve convinced me that it is corny and manipulative; you initially
thought that poem pretentious and unintelligible, but I have persuaded
you that it is quite powerful.  Yet when judges and juries make determina-
tions of obscenity, they may not converse with anyone.  The dangers of
parochialism are obvious.  Attorneys for Joyce’s Ulysses addressed the
problem by taking a copy of the book and pasting in it every review that
seemed useful (because anything in the book could be used as evidence)
and then provoking U.S. Customs into seizing that particular copy, which
then became the object of litigation.116  Texts draw their meaning from
their contexts.  Because no reader can completely know the context of
any text, no reader can have the last word about the meaning of any text.
Of course, much of the pornography that is available today is ob-
scene under Miller.  There was an enormous boom in pornography in the
1990s, fueled by the growth of the internet and cable TV.  Large corpora-
tions such as AT&T and Marriott have joined in its distribution.  The ex-
plosion was abetted by a distinct lack of interest among federal prosecu-
tors, since the Clinton Administration had other priorities.  Clinton’s
Attorney General, Janet Reno, thought that child pornography was the
51793&issn=00321478 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(paid); id. tit. Hustler, at http://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/Search/fullCitation.
asp?navPage=1&tab=1&serial_uid=51793&issn=00321478 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (paid); id. tit. Penthouse, at http://www.ulrichsweb.
com/ulrichsweb/Search/fullCitation.asp?navPage=1&tab=1&serial_uid=183183&issn=00
902020 (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (unspecified).
114. On the history of racist sexual scripts, see Andrew Koppelman, Why
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197,
220–34 (1994).
115. Booth, The Company We Keep, supra note 40, at 70–77. R
116. De Grazia, supra note 14, at 223–24. R
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only kind of pornography worth prosecuting.  John Ashcroft came with a
different agenda, but the distraction of the September 11th attack has
meant that federal prosecutions of pornography have resumed only very
recently.117  Material that would certainly have been suppressed a few de-
cades ago, and that would offend nearly every community, is now availa-
ble in vast quantities.  A cursory internet search quickly yields graphic
sexual fantasies involving rape, torture, bestiality, excrement, vomit, can-
nibalism, and necrophilia.118
But much of even this material is not clearly malign in its overall
intention.  One of the strangest examples is a website consisting of sexual
fantasies, visual and written, of boiling naked women alive and eating
them.119  It is, however, prominently accompanied by the following
musing:
If you have read this far, you may be wondering what kind of
person puts together a publication like this.  I think you might
be surprised at how plain I am in real life.  No, I don’t hate
women and I don’t like violence. . . . Frankly, I am at a loss to
explain why I find such fantasies erotic.  I don’t find the real
thing erotic at all.  I get angry when I read of real life violence.
Confronted with real situations similar to my fantasies, I don’t
think I would find them erotic (and I don’t plan to ever find
out).120
This self-serving disclaimer is hardly conclusive, and here it is only
possible to report my conclusion that the fixed norms that emerge from
the “Boiled Alive!” website are vastly superior to those implied by Playboy’s
Exotic Beauties.  The more general point is that malign fantasies, whether
racist or cannibalistic, can be harmless so long as the person who enter-
tains them recognizes that he is handling fire.  The website’s insistence
on “a healthy separation of fantasy and reality”121 is entirely absent from
Playboy.
117. For overviews of the recent history of the industry, see generally Frederick S.
Lane III, Obscene Profits:  The Entrepreneurs of Pornography in the Cyber Age (2000);
Frontline:  American Porn (Feb. 2002), at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/porn (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
118. Examples are collected at http://www.sickestsites.com (last visited May 9, 2005).
119. This material is probably obscene.  It appeals to the prurient interest of members
of a deviant group, see, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508–09 (1966) (holding
that such appeal can render a work obscene), and is patently offensive to the average
person.
120. Boiled Alive!, at http://daha.best.vwh.net/boiled/comments.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  The website collects correspondence
from other fetishists that is similarly decent and reflective.  Some even offer feminist
analyses of the fetish.  See id.  But feminist analysis is unlikely to be what brought them to
the website.
121. Boiled Alive!, at http://daha.best.vwh.net/boiled/main.shtml (last visited Feb. 2,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  Close readings of many pornographic films,
some of them well-known, may be found in Linda Williams, Hard Core:  Power, Pleasure,
and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (rev. ed. 1999).  Williams concludes that many
pornographic films offer morally dubious perspectives on sexuality and on women.  Id. at
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
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Perhaps the best defense that can be offered for legal standards as
crude as Miller would be that there is value in drawing the line some-
where.  One rule, never formally codified but widely understood and en-
forced before Miller, held that under no circumstances could a photo-
graph show pubic hair.122  The idea that a picture of the forbidden kind
would be morally harmful is risible.  The efforts pornographers were
forced to make to avoid the forbidden zone meant, however, that pornog-
raphy always conveyed, in addition to other fixed norms, an idea of moral
limits.  And one might say the same thing about the vaguer limitations of
Miller.123
Of course, the message that is conveyed by this type of ritualistic pro-
hibition is not merely that there are limits.  It is also that the limits are
here.  And that is a false message with moral consequences that are not
innocuous.  The same culture that made pubic hair taboo was largely ob-
livious to the moral wrongs of domestic violence, date rape, racial segre-
gation, sex discrimination, and the ferocious repression of gay people.124
If the aim is to create a morally discerning citizenry, then it is counter-
productive to teach them such nonsense.
A definition that gets at the problem with somewhat more precision
is that adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina v. Butler.125
The Court held that material would probably be obscene if it depicted
explicit sex with violence, and that it would certainly be obscene if it
showed “explicit sex without violence, but which subjects participants to
treatment that is degrading and dehumanizing if the material creates a
substantial risk of harm.”126  By focusing on what is “degrading and dehu-
manizing,” the Court did get at the problem of moral harm, more accu-
rately than the U.S. Supreme Court had in Miller.  But the clarity ended
there.  It is possible to depict degrading and dehumanizing treatment for
morally impeccable reasons; the Court presumably did not mean to ban
the depiction of Nazi atrocities in Schindler’s List.127  And the confusion is
exacerbated by the requirement that the trier decide (which will mean in
practice, guess)128 whether “the material creates a substantial risk of
harm.”  It is unsurprising that this vague test has in practice been used to
275–77.  But as her book dramatically illustrates, the reasoning that leads to this ultimate
moral evaluation enlists a degree of literary sophistication that judges and juries would be
hard put to duplicate.
122. The informal barrier lasted until 1971, when Penthouse broke the barrier, shortly
followed by Playboy.  See de Grazia, supra note 14, at 578–79. R
123. This objection was raised by Lino Graglia.
124. Peter Berger similarly observes that, in the early- and mid-twentieth century, the
ethical system of Southern Protestant fundamentalism, which confined “sin” to private
wrongdoings such as fornication, gambling, and drunkenness, functioned to distract
attention from the more severe ethical difficulties posed by segregation.  Peter L. Berger,
Invitation to Sociology:  A Humanistic Perspective 113–14 (1963).
125. [1991] 1 S.C.R. 452.
126. Id. at 484.
127. Schindler’s List (Universal Studios 1993).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 141–184. R
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target and harass gay and lesbian bookstores.129  The idea of moral harm
appears not to be susceptible to codification in a legal definition.
F. The Varieties of Pornographic Experience
But what good is fantasy, anyway?  Is there any reason to think that
anything of substantial value would be lost if we suppressed the “Boiled
Alive!” website?  More generally, what good are the most offensive types
of pornography—those involving violence and degradation?  If this stuff
is worthless, then even if the law is somewhat imprecise in this area, per-
haps we should not be troubled.
My core assumption here is that sexual pleasure is good.  If pleasure
is good, then fantasy is good if it is an avenue to pleasure.  It is in the
nature of sexual fantasy that it is an avenue to pleasure.  It follows that
sexual fantasy is per se good.  It may be that there are other aspects of
fantasy, such as the provocation of destructive acting out, that outweigh
its goodness.  But this does not mean that the fantasies themselves are per
se bad.
The point may be clarified by exploring the psychological functions
of fantasy.  Even the strangest fantasies may be therapeutic for the person
who is having them.  Sexual fantasies, Michael Bader argues, should be
understood as manifestations of the mind attempting creatively to con-
struct a scenario in which pleasure can be pursued safely.130  Thus, for
example, Bader, who is a psychotherapist, describes a patient (he calls
her Jan) who could not have an orgasm with her husband unless she
fantasized that a large, strange man was holding her down and forcing
sex on her.  Jan, who was an outspoken feminist, was bewildered and em-
barrassed by her fantasy, which involved just the kind of man that she
loathed in real life.  The fantasy was eventually explained in this way.  Jan
unconsciously believed that men were fragile and unable to stand up for
themselves.  She feared that, if she fully expressed her own sexuality, most
men would feel threatened and overwhelmed.  And she felt guilty about
hurting them.  The fantasy resolved this difficulty by creating a man so
strong he could not be hurt, who needed no help from her in taking his
pleasure.  This created a safe environment in which she could take her
129. See Janine Fuller & Stuart Blackley, Restricted Entry:  Censorship on Trial
(1995).  The Court conceded that these abuses had taken place in Little Sisters Book & Art
Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, but declined to place substantial limits on the
state’s ability to regulate obscenity.  Instead, it merely admonished the government to
reform its own procedures.  The consequence has been that the gay bookstores have
continued to be harassed by Canadian Customs, which may ultimately prevail by wearing
down the bookstores’ financial ability to continue to litigate.  See Little Sisters Book & Art
Emporium v. Canada, No. CA32104, 2005 B.C.C. Lexis 299 (Feb. 18, 2005) (reversing
award of costs to bookstore).
130. Michael J. Bader, Arousal:  The Secret Logic of Sexual Fantasies 51–55 (2002).  A
similar analysis can explain many other fantasies, including those involving urination and
defecation, exhibitionism and voyeurism, cross-dressing, incest, and multiple partners.  See
id. at 115–41.
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own pleasure.  Once she understood this, her relationship with her hus-
band improved.  Bader thinks that many domination fantasies take this
form; they often circumvent guilt and thus enable desire.131
Quite a lot of fantasy takes the form that Bader describes.  Consider
nonsexual violent fantasy, which he does not consider but which is a sta-
ple of popular culture.  The typical scenario is one in which it is first
established that there are some truly terrible people, for whom no pun-
ishment would be sufficiently severe.  Then the hero, after considerable
difficulty, proceeds to do in these nasties, one by one.  The audience
cheers, because they have been given a permissible outlet for their own
inclinations to violence.  As with pornography, the fantasy has created a
context in which it is safe to pursue a dangerous kind of pleasure—more
dangerous here than in the sexual case, because it is clear that the bad
guys are not consenting to what is happening to them.  Unlike the porno-
graphic fantasies, the evildoers’ pain and fear is a necessary element of
the fantasy.  Which fantasy is more malign?  We put up with violent en-
tertainment, because we know that most viewers can handle it.  It makes
them happy, and it is good for people to be happy.
One might easily imagine an adolescent Jan exploring pornographic
fantasies of rape, even ones that include the vicious idea that women
secretly want to be raped and benefit from it.132  That idea is unlikely
ever to be more than a nonce belief for her.  For reasons she will proba-
bly not fully understand, these will be the fantasies that arouse her.  If
pleasure is good, then for her, this pornography is good.  Moreover, the
experience of gay adolescents with gay pornography shows that the expe-
rience of communicating fantasy, and of exploring the fantasies of others,
can be a powerful antidote to sexual shame.133  It will do Jan good to
know that she is not the only woman in the world who is aroused by rape
fantasies.
The unconscious mind has its own logic.  But this is not an animal
process.  Animals do not have fetishes, or cross-dress, or need to act out
sexual scripts.134  These are distinctively human activities.  They reveal
131. Id. at 51–55.
132. Identifying this idea as a fixed norm in any particular text is tricky business.
Linda Williams’s survey of various types of sadomasochistic pornography finds that in all
the films she surveyed, “violence invariably arises out of an agreement between dominator
and dominated.”  Williams, supra note 121, at 212. R
133. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech:  The Social Utility of Pornography, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 661, 687–89 (1995) (emphasizing value of gay male pornography).  But see
Christopher N. Kendall, Gay Male Pornography:  An Issue of Sex Discrimination (2004).
Kendall condemns gay male “pornography,” but uses that word to refer only to erotic
expression that “valorizes male dominance” and that indicates “that those who choose not
to adopt this identity have no value, no power.”  Id. at 129.  The benefits of pornography
for many readers are examined at length in Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography:
Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s Rights 141–78 (1995), although Strossen
overstates her case by refusing to acknowledge any countervailing harms.
134. Nussbaum observes that if the desire for sex were a purely physical appetite, it
would be hard to understand how there could be pornography at all.  The desire for food
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-5\COL506.txt unknown Seq: 28 19-MAY-05 11:24
1662 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1635
the creative potential of the human mind.  For that reason, they have a
dignity of their own.  If people are entitled to respect, then their sexual
desires are entitled to respect.  People live better lives if they have some
space in which those desires are not judged, but respected and made to
count for something.  The last thing Jan needs is to be told that her fanta-
sies are so awful that she must not even imagine them.135  It is as pre-
sumptuous for an outsider to interfere here as elsewhere.136
What is bad for one reader is not necessarily bad for another.  Booth
quotes with approval William James’s defense of the proliferation of relig-
ious creeds:
No two of us have identical difficulties, nor should we be ex-
pected to work out identical solutions.  Each, from his peculiar
angle of observation, takes in a certain sphere of fact and
trouble, which each must deal with in a unique manner.  One of
us must soften himself, another must harden himself; one must
cannot be assuaged by food-pornography.  Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, supra note
73, at 30. R
135. The idea of rape is distasteful.  I find it surprising that anyone would be aroused
by it.  But one of Freud’s key insights is that the overt and latent content of fantasies
(sexual or otherwise) are likely to be very different from each other.  Sexual fantasies
operate at a quasi-infantile level of consciousness, where the superego cannot operate and
where moral judgment is misplaced.  Jan’s fantasy, for example, isn’t really about rape at
all:  Rape is a placeholder for the relief of other needs.  Shirley MacLaine’s observation
that “sex is hardly ever about sex” applies with special force here.  Bader, supra note 130, at R
17 (quoting Shirley MacLaine).  Bader found an explanation for Jan’s fantasy, but other
analysands with rape fantasies will doubtless call for other explanations.  The
disproportionate importance of latent content in pornographic texts enormously
complicates the effort to discern the fixed norms in those texts.
If Jan were really turned on by anything resembling real rape, one would expect her to
be sexually involved with a partner who despises her and treats her badly.  Many people
are.  But in fact Jan’s biggest problem was her inappropriate feelings of guilt about her
fantasy, which were damaging her relationship with her husband.  It will sometimes
happen that guilt is one of the principal obstacles to someone’s capacity to achieve love.  If
Jan despises her own sexuality, then we shouldn’t be surprised if she doesn’t feel all that
charitable toward her husband’s.  The projection of one’s unconscious guilt feelings onto
others is a familiar and fertile source of cruelty.
Love is a complicated psychological achievement, balancing a formidable array of
conscious and unconscious forces; it is impressive that so many people manage to
accomplish it successfully.  See generally Martin Bergmann, The Anatomy of Loving:  The
Story of Man’s Quest to Know What Love Is 277–78 (1987) (Freudian account of the
psychic dynamics of ideal sexual love).  If Jan’s only problem is that her fantasy life is
distasteful to third parties like me and (perhaps!) you, she is in pretty good shape.  Thanks
to Harry Clor for demanding better articulation of this point.
136. This is one reason why it is a mistake to withdraw First Amendment protection
from pornography on the ground that it appeals to the passions and not to reason.  See
John M. Finnis, “Reason and Passion”:  The Constitutional Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 222, 222–27 (1967).  Finnis’s argument depends on a
dubious aesthetic, in which artistic value depends on a degree of detachment from the
narrative to which few readers aspire.  See id. at 239.  Most art appeals to the passions.
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yield a point, another must stand firm—in order the better to
defend the position assigned him.137
Clor observes that the most prominent defenses of pornography are
inconsistent with one another:138  Perhaps pornography has no effect at
all on readers’ attitudes and inclinations; perhaps it does affect readers’
sexual behaviors, but only in positive ways, by freeing them of stultifying
inhibitions; perhaps, as Susan Sontag famously observed, it promotes self-
knowledge, by affording a window into “the demonic forces in human
consciousness . . . which range from the impulse to commit sudden arbi-
trary violence upon another person to the voluptuous yearning for the
extinction of one’s consciousness, for death itself.”139  Clor evidently
thinks that one cannot coherently make all these claims at once.  But it
seems likely each of them describes different pornographies and their
effects on different readers.
Different people are aroused by different things.  Some of the things
that arouse some people are disturbing to other people.  Fantasies are
very hard, perhaps impossible, to change.140  And why bother to try, if
they do not manifest themselves in harmful activity?
G. What About Sexual Violence?141
But of course, sometimes harmful activity does ensue.  The thought
is sometimes prelude to the deed.  The population that is aroused by rape
fantasies includes some real rapists.142  Could it be the case that censor-
ship will prevent acts of violence?  If so, then the benefits of suppression
might be so great that they would outweigh any harm to the consumers of
pornography.
At this point, of course, we are no longer talking about moral harm.
The claim that pornography tends to cause sexual violence is not con-
cerned with morality, and it does not need the idea of moral harm in
137. Booth, The Company We Keep, supra note 40, at 57 (quoting William James, R
The Varieties of Religious Experience 384 (Frederick H. Burkhardt et al. eds., 1985)).
138. Clor, Public Morality and Liberal Society, supra note 28, at 200–09. R
139. Susan Sontag, The Pornographic Imagination, in Perspectives on Pornography
131, 154 (Douglas A. Hughes ed., 1970).
140. See Bader, supra note 130, at 210–17; Sandra Lee Bartky, Feminine Masochism R
and the Politics of Personal Transformation, in Femininity and Domination:  Studies in the
Phenomenology of Oppression 45, 55–58 (1990).
141. This subpart is heavily indebted to the assistance of Prof. Neil Malamuth of
UCLA, whose generosity with his time should not be taken to signify agreement with what
is said here.  Thanks also to Shari Diamond and John Heinz for helpful conversations.
142. Bader observes that male fantasies about raping women can take two forms.  In
one, the man appears to be hurting the woman but really is not:  This fantasy is a way of
mastering feelings of guilt about hurting others.  In the other, the woman is in real pain.
In the second set of cases, Bader thinks, the man has probably experienced himself as a
helpless victim of a powerful attacker, typically a parent.  He masters this experience by
turning the tables, so that he is now the victimizer.  This may be the fantasy that usually
accompanies actual rape.  Bader, supra note 130, at 126–27.  Depictions of rape probably R
appeal to both sorts of men.
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order to make its case.143  Nonetheless, the claim is relevant, because sex-
ual violence may be a powerful tangible indicator of moral harm, which is
necessarily hard to detect.  There may, of course, be forms of moral harm
that do not manifest themselves in bad behavior.  But as a general matter,
it is reasonable to surmise that bad deeds are done by bad people.  So if
we have good evidence that pornography causes men to abuse or even
rape women, this will give us reason to think that the men are being mor-
ally harmed.
This subpart reviews the empirical evidence and concludes that it is
reasonable to infer that pornography is causally connected with some sex-
ual violence, though the effect is relatively small.  This is consistent with
the general claim of this Essay, that pornography does cause some moral
harm.  But, I will argue, this effect is too small, its relation to any particu-
lar text too uncertain, and the benefits of censorship too speculative to
justify legal intervention.
There are two types of studies that have plausibly linked pornogra-
phy with violence.  The first type conducts controlled experiments in lab-
oratory settings, exposing men to various kinds of pornography and ob-
serving their attitudes and behaviors afterward.  The other uses
questionnaires, administered to large representative samples of men, that
measure pornography consumption, self-reported aggressive behavior,
and other variables.  Both types of study have inevitable limitations.  In
the laboratory, one can manipulate the relevant variables in the test and
control groups in order to confidently establish causation, but one can-
not be sure that the findings will apply outside the lab.  In natural set-
tings, one can show correlations, but typically one cannot identify the
causal basis.  All one can hope to do with correlations is establish associa-
tions between variables that are consistent with the causation that has
been shown in the lab.  These limitations could only be overcome by what
is impossible as a practical matter:  A long term study that exposed differ-
ent groups to different kinds and amounts of pornography (reliably keep-
ing control over what each group’s members ever get to see!) and then
observed, over a period of years, their behavior toward girlfriends and
spouses, their reactions to the sexual aggression of others, their behavior
on juries in rape trials, and so forth.  So the lab and survey data, for all
their limitations, are the best we are likely ever to have.144
143. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in MacKinnon, Feminism
Unmodified, supra note 90, at 146, 146. R
144. Other sources of evidence include longitudinal studies of the experience of
states and countries that have changed their practices with respect to pornography,
accounts by rape victims, and rapists’ own explanations for their actions.  For reasons
explored elsewhere, these are weak sources of evidence of causation.  See Andrew
Koppelman, Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality 238–40 (1996) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Antidiscrimination].  They may, however, tend to refute causal claims if there
is a negative correlation.  See, e.g., infra note 151. R
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The strongest reading of the lab studies finds that exposure to cer-
tain violent pornography, in particular that which depicts rape as “plea-
surable, sexually arousing, and beneficial to the female victim,”145
increases normal men’s willingness to aggress against women
under laboratory conditions; makes both women and men sub-
stantially less able to perceive accounts of rape as accounts of
rape; makes normal men more closely resemble convicted rap-
ists psychologically; increases all the attitudinal measures that
are known to correlate with rape, such as hostility toward wo-
men, propensity to rape, condoning rape, and predicting that
one would rape or force sex on a woman if one knew one would
not get caught; and produces other attitude changes in men like
increasing the extent of their trivialization, dehumanization,
and objectification of women.146
These effects, without more, would not be a sufficient justification
for censorship.  As already noted, laboratory studies cannot establish what
happens outside the lab.  Short-term attitudinal and behavioral changes
are all that laboratory studies, by their nature, could possibly show.  More-
over, the laboratory studies also found that the effect of even this kind of
pornography was not inevitably malign.  When men who had been ex-
posed to these misogynistic materials were later given debriefing sessions
that included materials dispelling rape myths and detailing the harms wo-
men suffer as a consequence of rape, the net effect was striking.  After
these men were exposed both to violent pornography and to pro-feminist
material, they had more positive, less discriminatory, and less stereotyped
attitudes toward women than they did before the experiment.  Moreover,
negative attitudes toward women were more effectively reduced by expo-
sure to both violent pornography and feminist materials than by expo-
sure only to the latter.147  Nadine Strossen observes that these findings
are “completely consistent with a central tenet of U.S. free speech juris-
prudence:  that the appropriate antidote to speech with which we disa-
gree, or which offends us, is more speech.”148
Moreover, even the negative attitudinal effects associated with vio-
lent pornography have less to do with their sexual content than with their
violence.  Nonviolent sexual materials do not produce any increase in
negative attitudes toward women, much less aggressive behavior.149
Some studies have even found that “exposure to nonviolent sexually ex-
plicit expression actually reduces aggression in laboratory settings.”150  Ex-
145. Edward Donnerstein et al., The Question of Pornography:  Research Findings
and Policy Implications 4 (1987).
146. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 304 n.6 (1989)
[hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State].
147. See Donnerstein et al., supra note 145, at 180–85. R
148. Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “the” Feminist Critique of Pornography,
79 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1168 (1993) [hereinafter Strossen, A Feminist Critique].
149. See Donnerstein et al., supra note 145, at 72. R
150. Strossen, A Feminist Critique, supra note 148, at 1182. R
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posure to violent but nonsexual films, particularly those that show vio-
lence against women, produce attitudinal and behavioral responses in
experimental subjects similar to those that exposure to violent pornogra-
phy produces.151
The other source of data is surveys of representative samples of men
that seek to correlate pornography consumption with self-reported sexual
aggression, such as obtaining unwanted sexual contact or sexual inter-
course by threatening or using physical force such as arm-twisting, by con-
tinual arguments and pressure, or by using alcohol or drugs.152  These
studies could not control the content of the pornography involved in the
way that the lab studies could, and instead asked about subjects’ rate of
consumption of familiar sex magazines such as Playboy and Penthouse.
The most thorough recent study of this kind found that
for the majority of American men, pornography exposure (even
at the highest levels assessed here) is not associated with high
levels of sexual aggression . . . . But among those at the highest
“predisposing” risk level for sexual aggression (a little above 7%
of the entire sample), those who are very frequent pornography
users (about 12% of this high risk group) have sexual aggression
levels approximately four times higher than their counterparts
who do not use pornography.153
The predisposing risk factors included such characteristics as sexual
promiscuity, hostility toward women, attitudes accepting of violence
against women, narcissistic personality characteristics, and growing up in
151. See Donnerstein et al., supra note 145, at 110–12; Edward I. Donnerstein & R
Daniel G. Linz, The Question of Pornography:  It Is Not Sex, but Violence, that Is an
Obscenity in Our Society, Psychol. Today, Dec. 1986, at 56, 56–59.  It remains uncertain,
however, whether depictions of violence, sexual or otherwise, causes an aggregate increase
in violent behavior.  An interesting natural experiment was recently conducted in Japan,
where, after 1990, stringent legal restrictions on pornography suddenly evaporated.
Thereafter, sexually oriented material proliferated, and it was typically much more
aggressive and violent than that found in the United States.  Over the same period, the
incidence of sexual assault decreased dramatically.  See Milton Diamond & Ayako
Uchiyama, Pornography, Rape, and Sex Crimes in Japan, 22 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 1
(1999).  Sexual assault is massively underreported in Japan, see Charles A. Radin, Rape in
Japan:  The Crime that Has No Name, Boston Globe, Mar. 8, 1996, at 1, but there is no
reason to think that this problem has become any worse in recent years.  It would be
reckless to credit the pornography for the drop in sex crimes, but this evidence confounds
any claim that violent pornography is likely to cause an increase in such crimes.
152. The text of the questionnaire relied on appears in Mary P. Koss et al., The Scope
of Rape:  Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National
Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 162, 167
(1987).  The use of the questionnaire in the pornography study is noted in Neil M.
Malamuth et al., Pornography and Sexual Aggression:  Are There Reliable Effects and Can
We Understand Them?, Ann. Rev. Sex Res., 2000, at 26, 63–64.
153. Malamuth et al. supra note 152, at 85.  This article is a rejoinder to the much R
more skeptical review of the data in William A. Fisher & Guy Grenier, Violent
Pornography, Antiwoman Thoughts, and Antiwoman Acts:  In Search of Reliable Effects,
31 J. Sex Res. 23 (1994).
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a home with parental violence or child abuse.154  Consumption of large
amounts of pornography was strongly associated with aggression in 12%
of this 7%, or 0.84% of the population as a whole.  There was a weaker,
but still statistically significant, correlation in other groups of men.155
Since correlation does not indicate the direction of causation, it is impos-
sible to tell from this data whether, even within the high-risk group, por-
nography causes aggression against women or whether rather aggressive-
ness is a cause of the subjects’ interest in pornography.  The latter could
be the case because these men enjoy thinking about women as available
and vulnerable, or because these men have difficulty finding actual sexual
partners because of their poor social skills and strong desire to control
others.156
It is a reasonable inference from the two types of study, taken to-
gether, that relatively high sexually aggressive tendencies in some men,
resulting from other developmental factors, leads a small percentage of
them to use a large amount of pornography, and such heavy pornogra-
phy exposure may correspondingly reinforce and therefore increase their
aggressive tendencies.  But it is a long way from that inference to a justifi-
cation for censorship.
To begin with, there is a very poor fit between the problem that
these studies find and the solution that obscenity law offers.  Modern
American obscenity doctrine, we have already seen, does not require that
material be violent in order to be deemed obscene,157 and no amount of
violence will make a publication obscene absent some sexual element.158
Censoring all depictions of violence against women that make such vio-
lence seem attractive would, of course, require a much larger censorial
apparatus than almost any critic of pornography contemplates.159  And in
the age of the internet, it is hard to imagine how that apparatus could
possibly succeed.160
Next, note how isolated is the correlation shown in the survey data.
The effects appear to be relatively weak with respect to more than 99% of
154. Malamuth et al., supra note 152, at 64-65, 73; Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, R
Pornography and Teenagers:  The Importance of Individual Differences, in Adolescent
Medicine:  State of the Art Reviews (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 9, 13–14, on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
155. Malamuth et al., supra note 152, at 76–78. R
156. Id. at 58–59, 79.
157. See supra note 12. R
158. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001)
(invalidating restriction on minors’ access to violent video games).
159. Clor, clear-eyed here as elsewhere, understands that the logic of his argument
entails the censorship of some violent entertainment, such as the novels of Mickey
Spillane.  Clor, Obscenity and Public Morality, supra note 25, at 235–36, 245; Clor, Public R
Morality and Liberal Society, supra note 28, at 224–25. R
160. The impossibility of restricting pornography consumption in the age of the
internet is briefly and elegantly explained in Eugene Volokh, Obscenity Crackdown—What
Will the Next Step Be?, TechKnowledge, Apr. 12, 2004, at http://www.cato.org/tech/tk/
040412-tk.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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male readers of pornography.161  And pornography appears to be a rela-
tively minor cause of the sexual violence that actually occurs, since far
more than .84% of American men have engaged in sexual coercion.162
One might reasonably respond that any reduction in sexual violence,
however small, is worth achieving.  But the data do not show that even
with respect to high-risk men, suppression of pornography would bring
about any reduction in aggression.  Those men appear to be inflamed,
not only by violent pornography, but also by milder fare such as Playboy.
If one suppressed that, too, they still might arouse themselves in the same
way, and with the same result, with the Sports Illustrated swimsuit issue.
What arouses men depends (among many other things!) on cultural
norms of bodily concealment.  In Iran, women have been regarded as
indecently exposed when strands of hair have been visible from under-
neath their veils.163  It is also not remotely possible to estimate the num-
bers on other side of the ledger:  cases in which pornography served as a
“safety valve” that induced a potentially violent person to stay harmlessly
in his room.
Compare the evidence that smoking causes lung cancer, or that
drunk driving causes accidents.  MacKinnon has pressed the analogy with
the evidence in these other cases in order to argue that the opponents of
pornography have been held to an unreasonably strict standard of causa-
tion.164  Laboratory studies consistently show that exposure to tobacco
smoke causes cancer in laboratory animals,165 and that ingestion of alco-
161. Aside from actual sexual violence, there may also be
effects on other less extreme behaviors, such as domineeringness in conversation
or the way a person votes as a member of a jury in a rape trial.  Although these
latter types of changes may not necessarily be considered serious antisocial acts in
and of themselves, they may affect the cultural climate that indirectly affects the
likelihood of various antisocial acts such as sexual aggression.
Malamuth & Huppin, supra note 154, at 4.  These effects are not necessarily confined to R
the high-risk population.  Here, of course, we are no longer talking about violence, but
rather have shifted back to more general types of moral harm.
162. One very large national survey (using the same questionnaire that was used in
the pornography survey just discussed) found that 19% of college-age men admitted
having obtained sexual contact through the use of physical force, 10% had brought about
unwanted sexual intercourse through continual arguments and pressure, 4% had brought
about unwanted sexual intercourse through the use of alcohol or drugs, and 1% admitted
to using physical force to obtain sexual intercourse.  Each of these figures appears to
underreport the aggression that takes place, because a simultaneous survey of college
women found that 54% of women reported sexual victimization, compared with only 25%
of men who admitted any degree of sexually aggressive behavior.  Koss et al., supra note
152, at 167–69 . R
163. See Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran 26–27, 70, 275 (2003).
164. See MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State, supra note 146, at 207.  For a R
similar argument that makes the same analogies, see generally Frederick Schauer,
Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 737.
165. See Smoking and Health:  A Report of the Surgeon General ch. 5, 29–31 (1979)
[hereinafter Smoking and Health].
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hol diminishes reaction time and coordination.166  Correlational studies
show that people who smoke are ten times more likely to develop lung
cancer than those who do not.167  Half of all fatal car accidents involve,
and at least half of those are caused by, drunk drivers.168  There is no
line-drawing problem, because there are no noncarcinogenic cigarettes
or nonimpairing alcoholic drinks.  There exists no subset of the popula-
tion that can safely smoke, or that can competently drive after several
drinks.  No one’s lungs are improved by tobacco smoke.  No one’s driving
is improved by alcohol.  If the population’s consumption of tobacco and
(among drivers) alcohol is reduced, there is little doubt that a reduction
in cancer and traffic accident deaths will follow.
But there is a deeper problem with the pornography studies.  When
we study alcohol or tobacco, we are fairly confident about which active
ingredient is producing the effect.  It is unlikely that the water in the
vodka is producing the diminished reaction time, or that the paper in the
cigarettes is causing the cancer.  Even with chemicals, it is hard to be sure
that we have isolated the active ingredient; that is why generic drugs
sometimes do not work as well as the brand names.169
The basic problem for pornography researchers is that books,
magazines, and movies do not have any inert ingredients.  A film may
depict rape as “pleasurable, sexually arousing, and beneficial to the fe-
male victim.”170  It will also have characters in it that provoke the viewer
to certain reactions; it will be edited in a way that pleases, bores, or over-
stimulates the viewer; the actors may be appealing or repulsive, and they
may be talented or wooden; the film stock may be beautifully clear or
irritatingly grainy, and so on.171  And we have not even started talking
about the story.
The laboratory studies of pornography presume that we know the
active ingredient in the films we are showing to the research subjects.
Censorship that relies on the lab studies further presumes that we can tell
which other films, not used in the studies, have that same active ingredi-
ent, and that we can extrapolate from the test conditions to other condi-
tions in the world and predict with confidence when similar results will
occur.  If the active ingredient is not isolated, then not only do the labo-
ratory studies lack external validity; we do not even know what happened
in the lab.
166. See 1 Henrik Wallgren & Herbert Barry, III, Actions of Alcohol:  Biochemical,
Physiological and Psychological Aspects 295–317 (1970).
167. See Smoking and Health, supra note 165, ch. 5, 11. R
168. H. Laurence Ross, Confronting Drunk Driving:  Social Policy for Saving Lives
36–37 (1992).
169. See Peter Meredith, Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic
Drug Substitution, 25 Clinical Therapeutics 2875, 2877–78 (2003).  This point was
emphasized in conversation by Ronald Allen, to whom this entire discussion is indebted.
170. Donnerstein et al., supra note 145, at 4. R
171. See Williams, supra note 121, at 194. R
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Laboratory researchers have addressed this problem intelligently, by
having subjects and controls look at carefully edited variants of the same
pornographic story or film, manipulating relevant variables such as con-
sent versus no consent, pain versus no pain, sexually aroused woman ver-
sus disgusted woman, etc.172  The basic purpose (though none of the re-
searchers have formulated it in these terms) is to construct texts with
clear fixed norms that are either favorable or unfavorable to sexual coer-
cion.  It is impossible to say, without examining the specific texts with
care, whether the researchers succeeded in this task.  Given the inevitable
complexity of texts, the difficulties are obvious.
Even if the researchers have succeeded in constructing stories with
determinate fixed norms, the problems that arise when one tries to gen-
eralize from those stories to any other depiction that anyone proposes to
censor are huge.  The tendency to generalize from the lab to some large
undifferentiated mass of “pornography,” Laura Kipnis observes, relies on
the unexamined assumption that low cultural forms are devoid of com-
plexity, and that its consumers are stupid and easily brainwashed.  The
dangerous fantasy that is at work here is a “projection of upper-class fears
about lower-class men:  brutish, animal-like, sexually voracious.”173  A film
is not like a drug.  It is infinitely more complex, and its effects are simi-
larly complex.
Once more, the real problem with the violent pornography that con-
cerns the researchers here is the fixed norms that are portrayed in the
texts.  If one were to be concerned merely about portrayals of sexual vio-
lence, then one would be required, absurdly, to ban feminist films such as
Boys Don’t Cry.174
Even with portrayals of sexual violence that make the violence ap-
pear attractive, matters are complicated.  One of the most vivid literary
treatments of sexual cruelty is Vladimir Nabokov’s novel, Lolita, which is
told from the point of view of the eloquent and witty pedophile Humbert
Humbert.175  For half a century critics have debated whether Nabokov
went too far in letting Humbert’s voice dominate the novel.  Not all read-
ers will notice how Nabokov subtly subverts his narrator’s ingenious apol-
172. See Fisher & Grenier, supra note 153, at 28; Neil M. Malamuth & James V.P. R
Check, Sexual Arousal to Rape and Consenting Depictions:  The Importance of the
Woman’s Arousal, 89 J. Abnormal Psychol. 763 (1980).
173. Laura Kipnis, Bound and Gagged:  Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in
America 175 (1999).
174. Boys Don’t Cry (Twentieth Century Fox 1999).  On the intractable difficulties of
devising a definition of unprotected pornography that is not massively overinclusive, see
generally James Lindgren, Defining Pornography, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1153 (1993).  The
present Essay is in part an attempt to explain theoretically Lindgren’s finding that no
definition produces reliable results.
175. Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita (1955).  The book’s subject matter, rather than its
mode of presenting that subject matter, was what prevented its publication in the United
States for years after it was written.  See de Grazia, supra note 14, at 243–72. R
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ogetics.176  The same problem is present in any narrative that makes the
appeal of evil actions intelligible, such as that of Milton’s heroically defi-
ant Satan in the early pages of Paradise Lost.177  Such portrayals are risky,
but morally valuable, precisely because they help to dispel the notion that
evil is wholly other.  That comfortable notion tends to beget the thought
that what we are doing cannot possibly be evil, since we are the ones who
are doing it.  It is more than coincidental that the same Department of
Justice that has lately revived obscenity prosecutions has also found itself
claiming unreviewable power to lock up anyone indefinitely,178 and de-
fending the extraction of forced confessions from alleged terrorists who
turned out to be innocent.179
A strong link between pornography consumption and sexual aggres-
sion has been found in less than one percent of men.  These men—often
raised in abusive homes, hostile toward women, self-centered and with
poor social skills180—are particularly at risk of moral harm.  They are
morally fragile just as children are morally fragile, and they might benefit
from benevolent censorship in the same way that children do.  But you
cannot limit their reading without controlling everyone’s.  The Supreme
Court once invalidated a law barring the sale of any material that might
have a deleterious effect on youth, explaining that the state may not “re-
duce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for chil-
dren.”181  It is similarly inappropriate to reduce the entire population to
reading only what is fit for persons with unusual sociopathic tendencies.
If the threshold for censorship is bad behavior in less than one percent of
the population, then much beside pornography will be censored.
Sometimes the worst will happen.  Representations, pornographic or
otherwise, will trigger destructive acting out by the viewer.  But texts and
viewers are so various that it is impossible to say when this will happen or
what will set it off.  The 1972 film Deep Throat reportedly inspired numer-
ous men to brutalize women in novel ways,182 but no one could have
anticipated that a hastily thrown together, low budget film could have
such an effect.  The early film career of Jodie Foster triggered John
176. See Booth, Rhetoric of Fiction, supra note 41, at 390–91.  On the other hand, R
some readers will see the subversion very clearly, and will be grateful for this window into
the mind of a certain familiar type of solipsistic wielder of power.  See Nafisi, supra note
163, at 35–37, 40–44, 48–50. R
177. John Milton, Paradise Lost (John Leonard ed., Penguin Books 2003) (2d ed.
1674).
178. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.
Ct. 2633 (2004); Padilla v. Hanft, No. CIV.A. 2:04-2221-26A, 2005 WL 465691 (D.S.C. Feb.
28, 2005).
179. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, New Yorker, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106.
180. See supra text accompanying note 154. R
181. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
182. Deep Throat (P.D. Inc. & Vanguard Films Production 1972).  See In Harm’s
Way:  The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings 68, 116, 215, 409–10 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997).
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Hinckley’s attempt to assassinate President Reagan.183  Leo Tolstoy’s story
The Kreutzer Sonata tells how a man is inflamed to murder his wife by lis-
tening to Beethoven.184
It is impossible for the law to predict the consequences of the dissem-
ination of any text, picture, or film.  What is possible is to read a text and
decide whether the fixed norms it contains are good or bad ones.  But if
the problem is that the texts and films promote bad fixed norms, then,
once more, the complexity of texts and films makes it impossible to fash-
ion a workable legal standard.
IV. PREVENTING MORAL HARM
So moral harm exists.  It might appear that the argument so far has
left the state impotent to prevent it.  There are, however, two common
methods that already are used to prevent such harm.  This Part will argue
that, while outright censorship is not an appropriate method for prevent-
ing moral harm, these other methods are not vulnerable to the same ob-
jections.  Both of these methods are even cruder than Miller, restricting
broad categories of sexually oriented speech without much attention to
whether any particular item is harmful, or even whether it is legally ob-
scene.  But this crudeness is tolerable because neither of these measures
prevents adults from viewing anything at all.  Nor do they require
merchants to make fine distinctions of literary judgment in order to avoid
criminal prosecution.
One such measure restricts what may be shown or sold to juveniles.
The law can bar the sale of sexually oriented material to minors even if it
is not obscene.185  The legal criteria for what children may or may not
purchase are remarkably broad:  Even simple representations of nudity
are typically forbidden.186  The rule for merchants therefore is simple:
Do not display or sell to minors sexually oriented material—a category
whose boundaries are, for the most part, fairly clear.
This rule makes sense if it is understood that sexual explicitness is
not constitutive of moral harm, but merely an indicator that it is a dan-
ger.  Child sexuality is malleable; it can be directed in morally bad ways.
Censorship is thus a routine part of what parents do.  Parents’ task is facil-
itated if material objectionable to many of them cannot be given to their
children without their permission.
183. See Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.
(1984).
184. Leo Tolstoy, The Kreutzer Sonata (Isai Kamen trans., 1957).
185. See supra Part III.C.
186. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-68-501 to -503 (Michie Supp. 2003); Fla. Stat. Ann.
§§ 847.001–.0134 (West 2002); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 235.20–.22 (McKinney 2000); Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 43.24 (Vernon 1994); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-390 to -391 (Michie 1996).
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art6
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-5\COL506.txt unknown Seq: 39 19-MAY-05 11:24
2005] DOES OBSCENITY CAUSE MORAL HARM? 1673
Moreover, in the United States, many parents want to prevent their
children from seeing any sexual material.187  Parents’ desire to shape the
formation of their children is itself an important aspect of human liberty
that deserves respect.188
The second of the crude restrictions that the Supreme Court has
permitted is what has been called “erogenous zoning.”189  The Court has
upheld the use of zoning laws to confine sexually related expression to
certain localities.190  Here, too, it is crucial that this type of restriction
does not mean that “the viewing public is unable to satisfy its appetite for
sexually explicit fare” or that “the market for this commodity is essentially
unrestrained.”191  The Court has, however, found it difficult to explain
what it was doing when it allowed this ordinance, and at one point it went
so far as to deny that such laws restricted speech on the basis of its con-
tent.192  It held that the purpose of the challenged ordinance was “to
prevent crime, protect the city’s retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally ‘protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city’s] neigh-
borhoods, commercial districts, and the quality of urban life,’ not to sup-
press the expression of unpopular views.”193  As Daniel Farber observes,
the Court’s profession of content neutrality cannot be taken seriously.
“Would the Court really uphold special zoning for computer book stores?
What about zoning of religious book stores, if those were shown to have
undesirable effects on the neighborhood?”194  In its most recent decision
on the question, there was no longer a majority for this dubious under-
standing of content neutrality, and Justice Kennedy, concurring in the
judgment supporting a zoning ordinance and providing the necessary
fifth vote for that judgment, conceded that the claim of content neutral-
ity was “something of a fiction.”195  He nonetheless upheld the ordinance
187. This desire becomes increasingly forlorn as the children approach adulthood.
See supra note 95.  But it can be enforced very effectively in the earlier years of childhood. R
188. See William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism:  The Implications of Value Pluralism
for Political Theory and Practice 93–109 (2002).
189. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 1130 (15th ed.
2004).
190. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–55 (1986); Young
v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 71–73 (1976).
191. Young, 427 U.S. at 62.
192. It has long been settled that content-based restrictions on speech are
presumptively unconstitutional.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law:  Principles
and Policies 902–09 (2d ed. 2002).
193. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
194. Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 140 (1998).  The studies on which the
Court relied also appear to be “junk science” of a kind that it has generally ruled
inadmissible as expert evidence.  See Mark Kernes, The Myth of Secondary Effects, at
http://www.freespeechcoalition.com/Myth_of_Secondary_Effects.htm (last visited Apr.12,
2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
195. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).  Justice Kennedy is the most consistent defender of free
speech on the Court, voting for free speech claimants approximately seventy-five percent
of the time.  See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994–2000,
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because it could operate “without substantially reducing speech.”196
These decisions are better understood as an effort to restrict the geo-
graphic scope of a certain kind of moral harm—a harm that is directly
related to the content of the speech in question.197
However, one means of preventing moral harm that should be abso-
lutely barred is the one at the core of obscenity law:  criminal prosecution
for selling forbidden materials to adults.  It is likely that some obscene
material causes harm to some adults.  But there are four fatal objections
to the use of the criminal law to prevent this kind of harm.
First, the litmus test for bad pornography that this Essay has sug-
gested—the text’s fixed norms regard people as mere objects of sexual
interest, whose feelings and desires do not matter—is too vague and con-
testable to be workable as a rule of law.  It could not give a publisher fair
notice of what is or is not prohibited.  Any proxy for it that does give fair
notice, such as the Miller test, will not fit the prohibition’s rationale.
Second, that rationale reaches far beyond pornography.  Malign
fixed norms are ubiquitous in literature, not least in mass market litera-
ture.  Sex does have a powerful rhetorical appeal, but hardly a unique
one.  Violence also has its charms.  Yet no amount of violence will render
a text legally obscene.  And, of course, there are morally pernicious works
of literature that do not graphically depict either sex or violence.  If gov-
48 UCLA L. Rev. 1191, 1193 (2001); for an updated version, see Eugene Volokh, How the
Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994–2002, at http://www1.law.ucla.edu/~volokh/
howvoted.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).  If Kennedy
is willing to tolerate content-based restrictions on protected speech in this context, then he
must think some powerful state interest is being served.  He has never articulated his own
reasons for withdrawing protection from certain categories of speech such as obscenity,
saying only that these are “historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar.”
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  On the other hand, writing for the Court in Ashcroft v.
Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), he discarded nearly every rationale for the
obscenity exception. Ashcroft invalidated a law that prohibited “virtual child pornography”:
sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors, but were actually produced by
computer imaging or by using adults that look like children.  “As a general principle,” he
noted, “the First Amendment bars the government from dictating what we see or read or
speak or hear.”  Id. at 245.  There was no compelling interest that could justify such a
broad prohibition.  Any causal link between such images and actual child abuse was
“contingent and indirect.”  Id. at 250.  Government had a legitimate interest in preventing
children from seeing such images, but “speech within the rights of adults to hear may not
be silenced completely in an attempt to shield children from it.”  Id. at 252.  If the idea that
children are appropriate sexual objects, presented in a sexually alluring way, is not
obnoxious enough to justify suppression, then what could possibly be so much worse than
it is beyond the pale?
196. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 450.
197. The problem with the law upheld by the Court is that it does this only for those
persons fortunate enough not to have an apartment across the street from all the porn
shops.  It protects the middle classes while concentrating the costs of pornography on the
poor.  Frederick Schauer emphasized this point in conversation.
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ernment generally is to be empowered to prevent the persuasive advocacy
of evil ideas, then that is the end of free speech.
This leads us to the third objection.  Banning even the worst obscen-
ity might not prevent any harm at all.  It depends on who would read the
stuff.  (And, of course, even morally admirable fictions are sometimes
misconstrued.198)  Even if a work of literature promotes very bad fixed
norms, those fixed norms must be accepted uncritically and internalized
by a reader before any harm can occur.  It is hard to find a single demon-
strable instance of moral harm caused by obscenity.199  This is unsurpris-
ing, since the harms we are most interested in take place on the same
plane as M’s contemplation of D in Murdoch’s fable, and are not observa-
ble by any third party.  And how should the positive value on the other
side be weighed?  Booth concedes that even the most malign material,
such as the pornographic novels of the sociopath Marquis de Sade, can
offer “the by-no-means contemptible gift of providing fodder for ethical
discourse, including my own.”200  Even if a fiction represents bad fixed
norms, it does not follow that it will produce moral harm.
Finally, there is an intractable difficulty in defining moral harm with
enough particularity to authoritatively determine whether any particular
fiction does or does not convey bad fixed norms.  There is uncertainty,
not only about the fixed norms of any particular work, but also about the
value or disvalue of many fixed norms, especially with respect to sex.
Thus far this Essay has considered “moral harm” at a very abstract
level.  The idea that moral harm exists and that some literature can pro-
mote it is widely shared.  But this consensus breaks down when we try to
specify the details of moral harm because Americans disagree so radically
about the details of moral well-being.  Is a person harmed if she is per-
suaded that premarital sex is morally permissible?  Homosexual sex?
Robert P. George argues that pornography depraves and corrupts by
“arousing sexual desire that is utterly unintegrated with the procreative
and unitive goods that give the sexual congress of men and women, as
husbands and wives, its value, meaning, and significance.”201  But it is far
from clear that such unintegrated sexual desire is always morally wrong,
or that it is never present even in the heterosexual marriages that George
most values and wishes to protect.202
198. See supra text accompanying notes 175–176. R
199. The strongest anecdotal evidence that has been cited has involved self-serving
claims of criminal defendants and stories of crime victims whose assailants used
pornography as a kind of “how-to” manual.  Even in the latter cases, it is impossible to
know which, if any, of the rapes would not have occurred had the pornography not been
available.  See Koppelman, Antidiscrimination, supra note 144, at 239–40. R
200. Booth, The Company We Keep, supra note 40, at 59. R
201. George, supra note 27, at 187. R
202. It is also doubtful that the experience of such desires “makes it difficult for
people to understand, intend, and experience sexual relations as other than a kind of self-
gratification involving, as part of its end, the ‘using’ and, in some sense, ‘possessing’ of
another.”  Id.  On the contrary, as argued supra Part III.A., desire of that kind is an
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So for legal purposes, moral harm should be understood at a very
high level of abstraction—so high that the law should not try to decide
whether it is present in any particular publication.203  Crude rules of law
are the right ones here precisely because the law is incompetent to make
finer distinctions.
The case is closely analogous to a familiar one in the jurisprudence
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.204  The Court has de-
clared that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.”205  But the Court has also acknowl-
edged that “the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special protec-
tion to the exercise of religion.”206
It is not logically possible for the government both to be neutral be-
tween religion and nonreligion and to give religion special protection.
Some justices and many commentators have therefore regarded the First
Amendment as in tension with itself.
I have suggested elsewhere that this apparent tension can be re-
solved in the following way.207  Begin with an axiom:  The Establishment
Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth.  A principal rea-
ineradicable aspect of sexuality itself.  For further critique of George’s conception of the
good achievable by sexuality, see Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case
Against Same-Sex Marriage, U. St. Thomas L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 18–24,
on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also Andrew Koppelman, The Gay Rights
Question in Contemporary American Law 80–93 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage
Inherently Heterosexual?, 42 Am. J. Jurisprudence 51, 95 (1997).
203. On the value of defining political ends at a high level of abstraction, see Andrew
Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 Rev. Pol. 633, 638–45 (2004) [hereinafter
Koppelman, Fluidity of Neutrality].
204. U.S. Const. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”).
205. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
206. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 812 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n one important respect, the
Constitution is not neutral on the subject of religion:  Under the Free Exercise Clause,
religiously motivated claims of conscience may give rise to constitutional rights that other
strongly held beliefs do not.”).
The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after Employment Division v.
Smith, which held that there is no right to religious exemptions from laws of general
applicability.  494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).  Even after Smith, however, religions retain
some special protection that nonreligious beliefs do not share.  In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, the Court struck down four ordinances that a city had enacted
with the avowed purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal sacrifice.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).  The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment because their object was the suppression of a religious practice.  Id. at
542, 547.  The result would have been different if the law had targeted a club that did
exactly what the Santeria did, not as part of a religious ritual, but because its members
thought that killing animals was fun.
207. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 Va. L. Rev. 87, 125–40 (2002).
This account of the Establishment Clause is further developed in Andrew Koppelman,
Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 393 (1999); Andrew
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son why it is so forbidden is because it is incompetent to determine the
nature of this truth.  “The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is
not better known to the magistrate than to private persons,” Locke wrote,
“and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide who may probably
be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned
for my salvation than I myself am.”208  Madison wrote that the idea “that
the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth” is “an arro-
gant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all
ages.”209
This incompetence forbids the state from favoring one religion over
another.  It also bars the state from taking a position on contested theo-
logical propositions, such as whether God exists.  There is an exception
for the “de facto establishment,” confined to public rituals of long stand-
ing whose religious content is sufficiently bland, but in its nature it can-
not permit any new instances.
It is, however, possible, without declaring religious truth, for the
state to favor religion at a very abstract level.  The Court noticed this in
Texas Monthly v. Bullock when it invalidated a law that granted a tax ex-
emption to theistic publications, but not atheistic or agnostic publica-
tions.210  Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion thought that a targeted ex-
emption would be appropriate for publications that “sought to promote
reflection and discussion about questions of ultimate value and the con-
tours of a good or meaningful life.”211  Justice Blackmun thought it per-
missible for the state to favor human activity that is specially concerned
with “such matters of conscience as life and death, good and evil, being
and nonbeing, right and wrong.”212  What is impermissible is for the state
to decide that one set of answers to these questions is the correct set.
But the state can abstain from endorsing any diagnosis of or pre-
scription for the universal human problem while acknowledging that
there is a problem, and that efforts to address it have a distinctive kind of
value.  Not all human activities attempt to respond to the fundamentally
flawed character of human existence.  Indeed, most human activities are
to some extent an effort to distract oneself from the problem.  The Estab-
lishment Clause permits the state to favor religion so long as “religion” is
understood very broadly to encompass all efforts to address the funda-
mental human problem, while forbidding any discrimination or prefer-
Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy:  A Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 729 (2003).
208. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 32 (William Popple trans., Patrick
Romanell ed., 1950) (1689).
209. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in
The Mind of the Founder:  Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 9 (Marvin
Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
210. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
211. Id. at 16 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J., joined by Marshall & Stevens, JJ.).
212. Id. at 27–28 (Blackmun, J., joined by O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
\\server05\productn\C\COL\105-5\COL506.txt unknown Seq: 44 19-MAY-05 11:24
1678 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:1635
ence among them.  The state is incompetent to determine the soundness
of any diagnosis or the efficacy of any prescription.
The status of “moral harm” is somewhat analogous to the constitu-
tional status of “religion.”  The state can recognize it and try to take ac-
count of it—at a very high level of abstraction.  What it cannot do is try to
make fine distinctions among instances of it.  That is beyond its compe-
tence.  And the idea of state incompetence is as important in free speech
doctrine as it is in religion clause doctrine.  It has particular bite here.
Just as government should not be able to decide for us the path to salva-
tion, so it should not be able to decide for us what our sexual fantasies
should be.
Finally, the inevitable clumsiness of any legal standard raises a funda-
mental human rights issue about arbitrary enforcement of the law.  There
is now a huge industry in pornography, much of which probably would be
found obscene under the Miller test by some juries in some jurisdic-
tions.213  The very large number of citizens who are engaged in the por-
nography business, a business which is openly tolerated by the law, can-
not tell when they might be subject to criminal prosecution.  Prosecutors
are typically unwilling to provide specific advance notice to dealers of sex-
ually oriented merchandise, for fear of being perceived as collaborating
with pornographers.214  The consequence is that a growing number of
citizens are vulnerable to being destroyed at the whim of the government.
These include some substantial economic actors.  Under Alexander v.
United States, a business can lose all its assets under the civil forfeiture
provisions of RICO215 if it sells pornographic material.216  Thus Ferris
Alexander, who once presided over a large business empire, had thirteen
theaters and bookstores and nine million dollars in inventory seized from
him and died in poverty after he was convicted of selling four obscene
magazines and three obscene videotapes.217  This means that, as this is
written, many large bookselling and hotel chains are potentially subject to
wholesale seizure by the government if it can be shown that they have
purveyed at least two obscene publications.218  This is a potent power and
has gone unused since Alexander, but it still sits handy, like a loaded
weapon, in case it is in government’s interest to destroy someone.  This
Essay is not intended to be a source of legal advice, but here is some for
213. See supra text accompanying notes 117–118. R
214. See Harvey, supra note 22, at 98–103. R
215. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 943 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2000)).
216. 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
217. See Mike Mosedale, The Porn Warrior at Rest:  Ferris Alexander’s Legacy, City
Pages (Minneapolis), Mar. 12, 2003, available at http://www.citypages.com/databank/24/
1162/article11110.asp (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
218. See Vartan Aznavoorian, Note, Using Racketeering Laws to Control Obscenity:
Alexander v. United States and the Perversion of RICO, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 553 (1995); Kendall
W. Harrison, Note, Alexander v. United States:  RICO, Pornography, and the Obscenity
Doctrine, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1549.
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anyone who plans to criticize incumbent politicians who wield the power
to prosecute:  Do not invest in hotels, bookstores, or cable TV companies.
This is not the rule of law.
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment is not an absolute.  The protection of speech
is shot through with exceptions that apply when countervailing social in-
terests are felt to be sufficiently threatened.  Is the moral condition of
citizens a sufficiently important interest to overcome the interest in free
speech?  An affirmative answer would be inconsistent with the viewpoint-
neutrality ordinarily associated with free speech,219 but neutrality has its
costs and they may not be worth it.220  The state’s interest must be
addressed.
This Essay argues that moral harm exists and that pornography can
cause it, but these premises do not entail that there should be censorship.
Moral harm requires more than a certain kind of text.  It also requires a
certain kind of reader.  Children often lack the necessary critical re-
sources to defend themselves from such harm, and this is why parents
routinely exercise censorship.221  Parents can appropriately decide that
certain materials are worthless and harmful, and that children cannot be
trusted to see them.  But it is not a light thing to treat adult citizens as if
they were children.
219. This is emphasized in Martin Redish’s critique of obscenity law in Freedom of
Expression.  Redish, supra note 5, at 68–76. R
220. Put another way, neutrality may be understood at many different levels of
abstraction.  See Koppelman, Fluidity of Neutrality, supra note 203, at 645–47. R
221. On the other hand, children also must develop those critical resources, and how
are they to do that without bad texts on which to practice?  The most morally destructive
texts that children routinely see are advertisements, which teach that happiness can and
should be bought.
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